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Access justice is one of the most appealing and least contentious regulatory
techniques in law’s repertoire. It aspires to give people equal opportunity to utilize
certain primary goods, and it does so by assuring openness—that access to these
goods is not allocated by markets and is not tilted in favor of wealth or privilege. But
access justice often fails to meet its egalitarian aspirations, because groups that are
not the intended targets of the intervention deploy access and its benefits disproportionately. Paradoxically, access justice often benefits various elites while paid for
directly by taxpayers and indirectly by weaker groups. This Article brings to light
this unintended and regressive cross-subsidy created by policies of access to information, compensation, insurance, accommodations, and more. It then examines in
detail a specific contemporary access justice paradox—consumers’ access to courts
and the impact of mandatory arbitration agreements that limit such access. This
Article demonstrates that access to courts is a franchise of the elite and of little value
to weak consumers. Nevertheless, it considers whether contractual waivers of access
to courts hurt weak consumers by foreclosing effective access through class-action
representatives. This concern has theoretical merit, but it, too, is limited in ways that
are often unappreciated.
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INTRODUCTION
A. Access Justice
Equal access is one of the most appealing and least contentious regulatory techniques in law’s repertoire. Equal access aspires to give people even entitlement to certain primary goods or
opportunities, and it does so by assuring openness—that access
to these entitlements is not allocated by market prices and is not
tilted in favor of wealth or privilege. Equal access is often secured
by public expenditures that finance free entry for all, but it is also
accomplished by mandates requiring providers to charge uniform
affordable prices or offer uniform accommodations.
Some of the classic public goods are delivered via the equal
access method: education, transportation, and parks. Public
schools are open and free, guaranteeing baseline access to education to all citizens. Roads and commuter services stretch out to all
communities and are also mostly free to use. And parks and waterfronts are held in the public trust, operated by the community and
open to all. Funded by the taxpayers, bolstered occasionally by
token usage fees, schools, roads, and parks are equally accessible.
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Equal access is also a popular device in protective laws. Protective laws are legal regimes that seek to help weaker groups in
society function better, enjoy more opportunity, and reach better
outcomes. Laws requiring that people with disabilities be afforded
equal access to buildings are a prominent example of this regulatory technique. So are policies and laws that require universal access to some forms of community banking and credit, personal
health and property insurance, and necessity goods. Many other
protective laws utilize the equal access technique, seeking to
guarantee universal access to a variety of goods and services, including information, knowledge, the Internet, medicine, safety,
compensation, and courts. These policies are often based on the
highly plausible prediction that, in the absence of such mandates
of open and equal access, weaker groups would fare worse.
There is a strong and alluring notion of equality underlying
various access policies. If these goods and services were subject to
market allocations, instead of being accessible to all through government mandates (and funding), the poor and the less sophisticated would be disproportionately priced out. Equal access enables those who could not otherwise afford to pay the true cost of
these services to consume the subsidized good. It thus promotes a
fundamental element of a liberal society—equal opportunity.
Equal access is alluring also because it is protective but not
heavily paternalistic. True, it is more intrusive than some other
regulation-lite techniques, such as mandated disclosure or the
use of “choice architecture,”1 because it mandates a baseline entitlement and limits opt-out, and thus interferes more aggressively
with (and often replaces) private markets. But it is less intrusive
than other command-and-control regulatory policies that go beyond the provision of access and mandate the quality or equality
of outcomes.
Undoubtedly, some equal access policies have had important
effects, helping disadvantaged groups. The days in which only the
privileged could obtain education or have access to health care are
gone. In fact, it would be difficult to imagine a liberal society without the guarantee of equal access to such core institutions. Many
of the accomplishments of equal access are now taken for granted,
regarded as the cornerstones of a just and fair society, and
rightly so.

1

See Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about
Health, Wealth, and Happiness 81–100 (Yale 2008).
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But at the frontier of present-day protective law there hover
various equal access policies with a more dubious foundation and
a less encouraging success record. These are policies that secure
free or subsidized access to all, but that some subgroups of people
enjoy disproportionately. Paid for by all, but enjoyed by the few,
these policies represent a cross-subsidy. This cross-subsidy may
be desirable when the beneficiaries are a subgroup of the weak
consumers who are the intended target of the redistributive concerns. This, for example, is the result of Medicaid and housing
assistance programs. The poor are the primary recipients, and the
programs redistribute wealth to reduce overall poverty. But the
cross-subsidy is undesirable and unintended when the beneficiaries are the elite and when the benefits are paid for by the less
privileged. It is the surprising prevalence of such unintended consequences that this Article exposes.
This question—the differential effect of protective laws
among groups of consumers—is not often addressed by legal commentators. It is quite well understood that legal mandates intended to benefit consumers can impose costs that may be passed
on to these consumers through higher prices, with adverse distributive consequences. Prior literature provided several criteria
to predict the winners and losers from cost pass-ons of mandatory
rules.2
But in the area of mandated access, the redistributive effect
is rarely studied. Instead, it is often assumed that mandated access policies, even if they come at some cost, are mostly beneficial
to the least privileged and most needy among consumers—those
whose access might otherwise be denied. Thus, a common response to perceptions of disadvantage and deprivation in consumer and employment markets is to prop up the legal protections. Mandating important transactional rights for consumers or
employees is thought to guarantee “access justice.” The weaker
parties, who are otherwise “excluded from the market,” would be
able to “participate in and reap the benefits of the [market].”3 Similarly, another prominent access concern is “access to

2
See Richard Craswell, Passing On the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 Stan L Rev 361, 372–95 (1991).
3
Hans-W. Micklitz, Introduction, in Hans-W. Micklitz, ed, The Many Concepts of
Social Justice in European Private Law 3, 5, 36 (Elgar 2011).
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knowledge”—shorthand for the right to use and participate in mediums of information and expression.4 In intellectual property
law, a “social movement” of access to knowledge views the limitations imposed on users by software vendors or patent holders as
unfair, calling for lawmakers to guarantee open access.5 Net neutrality—open access to the Internet—is another logical implication of access to knowledge.6 These access-to-knowledge initiatives are founded on the empirical assumption that the
beneficiaries of such protections are otherwise weaker than market participants who desire to restrict (and charge for) access.
I need a term for this paradigm, prevalent across all of law,
that favors mandated equal access as a regulatory method. “Access justice” seems direct and descriptive.7 It includes a variety of
views across many regulatory areas, and it is therefore a generalization. But it is a useful generalization because so many lawmakers and commentators embrace some version of mandated equal
access across a broad array of substantive issues.
It is so commonly assumed that access justice benefits the
weak that the premise has escaped any significant scrutiny. Obviously, the belief that access justice is progressive is deeply held
among liberals, who rely on it to advocate equal access reforms,
such as access to banking for the poor.8 But conservatives too accept the descriptive logic of access justice, even when opposing it
on normative grounds. Professor Richard Epstein, for example, explains that strong consumer protections—proposed by the European
Union and widely supported by access justice advocates—are
likely to benefit weak consumers. Epstein is ready to “assume
that the less-sophisticated half of . . . consumers stand to benefit
from the [protective] regulation and the more-sophisticated half

4
See Access to Knowledge (Information Society Project, 2015), archived at http://
perma.cc/J9S4-Z8TG.
5
See, for example, Gaëlle Krikorian, Access to Knowledge as a Field of Activism, in
Gaëlle Krikorian and Amy Kapczynski, eds, Access to Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual
Property 57, 68–74 (Zone 2010).
6
See, for example, Charter for Innovation, Creativity and Access to Knowledge
(FCForum, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/GA5U-RRGS; Angele A. Gilroy, Access to
Broadband Networks: The Net Neutrality Debate *1 (Congressional Research Service, July
1, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/SAY7-PUHX.
7
For an example of the use of the term “access justice” in the literature, see Micklitz,
Introduction at 5 (cited in note 3) (using “access justice” to describe the European Union’s
model of social justice).
8
See generally, for example, Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 Yale J Reg 121
(2004) (arguing for the progressive benefits of increasing low-income families’ access to
banking services).

1760

The University of Chicago Law Review

[83:1755

. . . are hurt by them, in equal degrees.”9 He thus views such access policies as “an implicit cross-subsidy of weak consumers by
their stronger counterparts.”10 This is an intuitive assumption
that no longer seems to require justification. Surely, mandatory
consumer protections that secure access to markets and to core
commercial rights greatly benefit weaker consumers who need
them more direly. Sophisticated consumers are less reliant on access mandates because they can bargain for them more effectively
or pay for access when necessary. Indeed, writing about equality
of opportunity—the political ideal that is the foundation of access
justice policies—Professor Robert Nozick conceded that such policies were either “directly worsening the situations of those more
favored with opportunity” or “improving the situation of those less
well-favored.”11
The view that mandated access justice helps the weak is
therefore widely shared and rests on highly plausible logic. My
goal in this Article is to challenge this view. I argue that in an
important range of activity, it is false. It relies on superficial logic
that can be debunked, and it is inconsistent with a large body of
existing empirical evidence. Rather than helping the weak, access
justice policies could be regressive, benefitting stronger consumers disproportionately, at times at the direct expense of the weak.
This is the paradox of access justice.
The argument I present is simple. Access justice is merely an
equality of opportunity, not of outcome. Some can draw on that
opportunity better than others can. If those who take advantage
of the open access and opportunity are disproportionately more
sophisticated and affluent, the benefit of the program ceases to be
progressive. And if the funding of such free programs burdens the
poor, the result can be outright regressive.
Consider, for example, free and open access to a parking lot
outside the city opera. Only people with cars, and mostly those
attending the opera, would benefit from the opportunity. This
rules out the poorest, who do not own cars in the first place, as
well as anyone else other than opera lovers. When the mayor decides to start charging market prices for parking in the lot, she
may be eliminating free and equal access, but she is hardly hurting the poor or working class community. She is merely ending a
9
Richard A. Epstein, Harmonization, Heterogeneity and Regulation: CESL, the Lost
Opportunity for Constructive Harmonization, 50 Common Mkt L Rev 207, 213 (2013).
10 Id at 213–14.
11 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 235 (Basic Books 1974).
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subsidy that flows from all taxpayers to a small, highly educated,
and relatively affluent elite group.12
I present in Part I of this Article a number of important social
and legal policies that mirror the opera parking metaphor. I show,
for example, that the long-standing federal scheme of subsidized
flood insurance, which is commonly justified on grounds of access
justice, is in fact a regressive policy, which provides subsidies to
the more affluent homeowners at the expense of the generally less
affluent taxpayers. The method I use to analyze this and other
access justice policies is to identify who are the likely beneficiaries
of the access program. Are there implicit “access handicaps”—
structural bars to entry—that afflict some populations? Does the
afflicted population that fails to realize the benefits of access consist primarily of the poor or other weak sectors? I also ask who
pays for the programs that are selectively utilized. Are the costs
spread widely on all taxpayers or all broadly defined potential users,
thus creating a subsidy from low-value users to high-value users?
In presenting the paradox of access justice, I stop short of
making a general claim that access justice policies are doomed to
be unfair. As stated at the opening, numerous long-standing access mandates—like public education and public housing—help
more and charge less those who can least afford such basic goods.
The claim I develop is that access justice is a mixed bag. People
often assume that it is enough to enact open access to achieve the
desired redistribution. Recognizing the patterns of access handicaps corrects this misperception. I show that the cross-subsidy
can go the wrong direction in systematic ways, and I trace this
misalignment to various important access justice policies. By
showing the recurrent failure of access justice, and the real possibility of a regressive bias, I hope to repudiate its mythic stature
as a formula for consumer protection.
B. Access to Justice: Limits on Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements
After introducing the potential general problem with access
justice, the second Part of this Article (Part II) zooms in on one of
the most contentious access justice debates of our time—access to
courts. The problem of access to courts—sometimes referred to as

12 See Joni Maya Cherbo and Monnie Peters, American Participation in Opera and
Musical Theater—1992 3–6 (Seven Locks 1995) (describing the demographic profile of the
3.3 percent of Americans who saw one or more operas during 1992).
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access to justice13—addresses the legality of predispute arbitration agreements. These agreements are often included in consumer and employment contracts, stipulating that any dispute
must be resolved through arbitration procedures, thus barring
any access to courts. An important upshot of the denial of access
to courts is the shutdown of class actions as a method for vindicating consumers’ and employees’ common complaints.
Here, as in other areas of access justice laws, it is commonly
assumed that mandatory arbitration clauses indeed hurt potential plaintiffs. Accordingly, the first step in Part II, after describing the phenomenon of mandatory arbitration agreements, is to
show that access to courts is yet another access justice policy that
distributes benefits to some more than others. Surveying a large
social science literature on access to courts, I present the possibility that access to courts is a privilege disproportionately deployed
by sophisticated consumers, and almost never by the poor. In such
cases, I argue, the denial of access to courts affects the sophisticated elite more than it affects others. Further, if the costs of lawsuits are spread evenly across all consumers who all pay higher
prices, then in effect access to courts is a regressive access justice
policy, benefitting the affluent at the expense of others.
Viewed in this light, contracts containing mandatory arbitration clauses eliminate the cross-subsidy. And, conversely, laws
that prohibit or strike down such mandatory arbitration clauses
restore access to courts but also restore the cross-subsidy. By reinstating the access-to-courts privilege, such laws force all consumers to pay for a benefit enjoyed only by the elite. If I am a poor
consumer unlikely to go to court, I do not benefit from access to
courts, and I might be worse off for it, by having to pay higher
prices.
But there is more. The second step in evaluating access-tocourts laws is to reassess this conclusion in light of the effect of
litigation through class actions. Even when initiated only by the
sophisticated few, class actions can benefit all consumers, either
by securing class-wide redress or by generating incentives for
firms to provide safer and better products to all consumers (including nonlitigants). This possibility raises the specter of vicarious
access—enjoying the value of access justice not in directly visiting
the open forum but in piggybacking on the visitation by others. If

13

See, for example, Office for Access to Justice Home (DOJ), archived at http://
perma.cc/9JAJ-U4XU.
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this form of access is beneficial for all consumers, mandatory arbitration clauses that eliminate class actions hurt consumers as
a group, not merely those with the propensity to sue.
The question whether class actions indeed create vicarious
access is empirically open. The last Section of Part II lays out the
contrasting conjectures regarding actual dissemination of the
benefits of class litigation. It concludes that despite the class-wide
effect of access to courts, subtle cross-subsidies may nevertheless
afflict this institution. It shows that in a variety of contexts, access to courts—even vicariously—does not benefit large groups of
less sophisticated, less affluent consumers.
I. ACCESS JUSTICE AND REDISTRIBUTION
A. The Regressive Possibility
Access justice is never equal. Some utilize the access more
than others. They visit the open forum more often, enjoy the goods
or services made accessible through the open forum more thoroughly, and use these accessible opportunities more effectively as
a gateway to other advantages. When the price of entry is fixed
(often at zero) and does not reflect such differential benefits, the
program is redistributive.
Thus, the fundamental distributive question is—who are the
beneficiaries of open access? Can they be identified systematically? And, of course, to evaluate the overall distributive footprint
of the program, we also need to know who pays for it. Whose resources are taxed to pay for the subsidized access?
In some important cases, the cross-subsidy brought about by
access justice is indeed progressive, favoring low-income people.
This is largely the case with respect to primary school education
in most big American cities, as well as access to emergency medical care or to city parks (although proximity to city parks affects
housing prices14 and might render the parks more accessible to
the wealthy). In the public school context, two important sources
of funding are property and income taxes, which are paid largely
by higher-income property owners.15 And public schools are more
14 John L. Crompton, The Impact of Parks on Property Values: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, 33 J Leisure Rsrch 1, 28 (2001).
15 See Jennifer Von Pohlmann, Property Tax Rates Highest for Homeowners Who
Have Owned between Five and 15 Years, Own High-End or Low-End Homes (RealtyTrac,
Mar 2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9BP3-8NGU (stating that those with the highestvalue homes pay the highest percentage of their property value to property tax and that
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likely to be attended by low-income people, because higher-income
families are more likely to opt out for private education.16 Likewise, emergency medical care (and access to urban trauma care
centers in particular) benefits many low-income and underinsured
groups, while largely funded by others.17 And the same is true for
city parks and beaches, more likely destinations of low-income
residents who cannot afford remote and luxurious vacation destinations. These are funded not primarily by entry fees but instead
by taxes and private donations.18
In another important class of cases, the direction of the crosssubsidy could systematically favor the middle class. Professor
George Stigler called this “Director’s Law of Public Income Redistribution” (after Professor Aaron Director’s empirical conjecture),
arguing that public expenditures are often made for the primary
benefit of the middle class, funded by taxes borne disproportionately by the rich and the poor.19 Stigler suggested that social security and tax exemptions for churches are examples of such promiddle-class redistribution. Social security, for example, taxes
most heavily, relative to the benefits they will receive, those who
begin work early (instead of continuing in school) or those who die
early, all favoring the middle class. Low-income taxpayers pay in
a larger share of their income, and, Stigler argued, because they
don’t live as long after retirement, they fail to reap the benefits of
the payouts.20
higher-end homes account for over half of the property tax nationwide). See also Jane
Wells, The Rich Do Not Pay the Most Taxes, They Pay All the Taxes (CNBC, Dec 11, 2013),
archived at http://perma.cc/5GK2-EBWM.
16 The Chicago Public Schools website reports that 86 percent of students enrolled in
the city’s public schools in 2014 came from low-income families. See CPS Stats and Facts
(Chicago Public Schools, Jan 11, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/83WS-JEKY.
17 See Amy Knowlton, et al, Patient Demographic and Health Factors Associated with
Frequent Use of Emergency Medical Services in a Midsized City, 20 Academic Emergency
Med 1101, 1102 (2013) (noting that “persons with Medicaid or Medicare coverage are
overrepresented among frequent [emergency department] users”); Tamyra Carroll Garcia,
Amy B. Bernstein, and Mary Ann Bush, Emergency Department Visitors and Visits: Who
Used the Emergency Room in 2007? *1 (National Center for Health Statistics, May 2010),
archived at http://perma.cc/L2AD-6AJK; January Angeles, Insuring All Americans Is a
Critical Component of an Efficient, High Quality Health Care System *2 (Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities, Apr 21, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/C59Z-XATG.
18 See Margaret Walls, Private Funding of Public Parks: Assessing the Role of Philanthropy *8 (Resources for the Future, Jan 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ABQ9-WW7C.
19 George J. Stigler, Director’s Law of Public Income Redistribution, 13 J L & Econ
1, 1–4 (1970).
20 Id at 3. See also Geoffrey T. Holtz, Social Security Discrimination against African
Americans: An Equal Protection Argument, in Lawrence A. Frolik, ed, Aging and the Law:
An Interdisciplinary Reader 111, 112–14 (Temple 1999).
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But there is a third possibility that has not been systematically treated—and it is the most problematic one—whereby the
cross-subsidy from access justice programs benefits the elite. It is
this paradox that this Article explores. This arises whenever the
benefits of programs that are at least partially paid for by taxpayers accrue disproportionately to the relatively wealthy. If everyone in society is asked to contribute equally to support a program,
but the affluent utilize that program more frequently, it will effectively transfer wealth from the poor to the rich.
The regressive cross-subsidy is rarely an intended effect. Unlike progressive welfare programs that are intended to reduce
poverty, regressive programs do not declare a goal to increase the
well-being of the wealthy. Progressive policies like food stamps
openly and unabashedly select their beneficiaries according to income. Regressive policies, by contrast, do not employ an explicit
selection criterion to rule in solely the affluent and rule out others. Formally, these programs allow access to all, often accompanied by egalitarian rhetoric.21 The pattern of selective utilization
that develops is subtler and less salient. It is only when the benefits to the wealthy from the program turn out to exceed the tax
and access fees they pay that a net regressive distribution occurs.
Accordingly, regressivity, as used here (and in the public finance literature), has two facets. The first measures how the benefits of the policy are distributed. Whenever poorer populations
utilize these benefits at a less-than-proportional rate, the policy
is regressive.22 This is a weak sense of regressivity, because the
funding for the policy might come from progressive taxes, suggesting that the overall redistribution does not hurt the poor. The
affluent pay more for those benefits that they also happen to access more readily.
The second criterion of regressivity represents a stronger,
and more troubling, form of inequality. It measures the effect of a
21 See Peter H. Schuck and Richard J. Zeckhauser, Targeting in Social Programs:
Avoiding Bad Bets, Removing Bad Apples 42–43 (Brookings 2006). Professors Peter H.
Schuck and Richard J. Zeckhauser consider poorly tailored social policies, including regressive policies. They point to a specific access justice policies—for example, subsidized
student loans—as “bad polic[ies]” that redistribute wealth regressively. See id at 41 n 60.
22 See, for example, Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern, Introduction,
in Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern, eds, Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century xix, xxix–xxxii (Oxford 1999). See also Tomás Serebrisky,
et al, Affordability and Subsidies in Public Urban Transport: What Do We Mean, What
Can Be Done?, 29 Transport Revs 715, 733–35 (2009) (concluding that supply-side transportation subsidies are “neutral or regressive” in their effects in part because the poor
choose to walk more than the nonpoor).
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particular public expenditures program on the overall inequality
of income and welfare distribution.23 Here, the assessment that
expenditures are regressive is made not only on the basis of how
the benefits are distributed, but also on the basis of who pays for
them. The elite now pay less for the benefits that they access more
readily. For example, tax revenues collected from middle- and
low-income earners are used to fund, in part, the program for the
wealthy.24
Before turning to examine actual regressive access justice
policies, a fundamental theoretical question needs to be addressed. Why, it may be asked, is it troubling that individual programs are regressive? Is it useful or even wise to assess the distributional equity of each specific policy? Governments, after all,
produce a large portfolio of public goods, some to benefit the poor
and others to benefit the affluent. If these programs are welfareenhancing overall, should they be abandoned when the benefits
are allocated inequitably? In fact, identifying a few isolated regressive programs is misleading because redistribution should be
measured by the overall effect of all programs. Some citizens benefit from program A, others from program B, and it is the combined effect of A and B that should be assessed.
Further, it may be argued, any regressive redistributive effect could be corrected by adequately designing the income tax
burdens. Affluent suburbanites may not pay directly for their disproportionate use of highways or remote parks, but their higher
income could be taxed more heavily.25 Thus, if building suburban
highways or marinas for yachts is welfare increasing, it ought to
be done notwithstanding its correctable distributive effect.

23 See Udo Ebert and Georg Tillmann, Distribution-Neutral Provision of Public
Goods, 29 Soc Choice & Welfare 107, 108 (2007) (“Distribution neutrality requires that the
. . . original income distribution and [ ] the new one, which also takes into account the net
benefits, are identical.”).
24 For an example of such a policy, see Part I.D.6 (discussing the Massachusetts Community Preservation Act, a program funded by lump sum fees on all deed registry transactions but benefitting only a few high-income communities that engage in land conservation).
25 See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than
the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J Legal Stud 667, 668 (1994) (“[R]edistribution through legal rules offers no advantage over redistribution through the income tax
system and typically is less efficient.”). See also generally Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter
given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 Am Econ Rev Papers & Proceedings 414 (1981) (arguing that it is preferable to redistribute wealth through taxation, rather than through
legal rules, even if the system of income taxation is imperfect).
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My purpose here is not to enter the normative debate over the
proper scope and method for redistribution. Rather, my goal is
descriptive: identify (in Parts I.D and II) the otherwise-unnoticed
distributive effects of specific legal policies. Access justice policies
are advocated, and their subsidies are enacted, with express distributive goals supported by progressive sentiments. Some policies are enacted to guarantee greater participation and equality
within societal institutions—an effect that cannot be similarly advanced by a mere transfer of cash, or tax benefits, to the target
groups. This justification relies critically on the relative rates of
utilization of the access privileges. Unintended regressive effects
should, therefore, inform the choice of such policies. Since my ultimate goal here is to evaluate the equity of specific regulatory
regimes that mandate access as a form of protection for weaker
consumers or employees, the direction of the distributive effect
seems to be crucial.
Moreover, while regressive effects of access justice policies
could in theory be offset by proper adjustments of income tax burdens, lawmaking does not regularly work this way. Some fiscal
programs may be bundled politically with shifting tax burdens,
but numerous laws and policies are enacted singly, unaccompanied by an income tax overhaul. If, as I suggest in the following
Section, some important access justice laws turn out to be regressive, it would be difficult to imagine that lawmakers would respond by increasing income tax on the benefitting subgroup, to
offset the cross-subsidy.
Finally, even if redistribution can be done more effectively
and efficiently through direct fiscal means, and even if its overall
goals are determined in the aggregate on the basis of some external principles of equity, one would still need to know how various
legal rules and policies affect the different groups. Knowledge of
their distributive effects is important so that the income tax system can be calibrated to achieve the desired level of redistribution
and to correct for disproportionate benefits that some subgroups
obtain elsewhere. Access justice is assumed to be egalitarian and
even progressive, a substitute to direct fiscal redistribution, thus
necessitating less, not more, corrective progressive taxation. But
if the regressive effects were prevalent, the opposite would be
true: redistributive taxes would be all the more necessary. In
short, society cannot achieve its desired overall level of redistribution if it miscounts the effects of some access justice programs.
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B. Regressive Public Expenditures
Having established that regressive redistribution is a theoretical possibility, I now turn to demonstrate some examples of
economic programs that illustrate this possibility. These examples will help develop, in Section C, a richer understanding of the
mechanisms that cause selective utilization of access. Later, in
Section D, with the understanding of such mechanisms, I examine some fundamental legal rules and policies that fit the regressive pattern. Here, at the outset, the illustrations come from fiscal
and budgetary programs.
Consider public expenditures that supply open access to remote parks, libraries, or museums. To access a remote national
park, people need to travel a distance, and those with cars, leisure
time, appreciation for nature, and disposable income to pay the
cost of travel and special gear are more likely to access the remote
park. State and national parks are indeed open and free to all
(with an occasional small entrance fee), but because they require
transportation and travel gear, they are largely inaccessible to
most lower-income residents of cities.26 Access is subject to an implicit cost of approach, and the more remote the location is, the
costlier to access. Public expenditure on maintaining free access
to remote vacation spots is regressive, at least in the weak sense
(in that the benefits accrue disproportionately to the better-off).
Roads and subsidized city parking lots may also be regressive
in the weak sense. Usage rates of open roads and parking lots are
higher among middle- and upper-income residents.27 The poor are
less likely to drive and park cars, and thus benefit less from highways and free lots. Many among the poor do not drive or commute
(due to disability, poverty, or joblessness), and many who do commute work close to home.28 Even public transportation could be
26

See Patricia A. Taylor, Burke D. Grandjean, and James H. Gramann, National
Park Service Comprehensive Survey of the American Public: 2008–2009; Racial and Ethnic
Diversity of National Park System Visitors and Non-visitors *11 (National Park Service,
Natural Resource Stewardship and Science, July 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/Y7MF
-PZHJ (finding that the cost of hotels and food is the leading reason people do not visit
national parks more frequently).
27 See Lisa Schweitzer and Brian D. Taylor, Just Pricing: The Distributional Effects
of Congestion Pricing and Sales Taxes, 35 Transp 797, 805, 808 (2008).
28 See Paul Ong and Evelyn Blumenberg, Job Access, Commute and Travel Burden
among Welfare Recipients, 35 Urban Stud 77, 82 (1998) (showing that Los Angeles welfare
recipients’ median commute was 7.5 miles, as opposed to an average of 16 miles for all
workers). See also Brian McKenzie, Who Drives to Work? Commuting by Automobile in the
United States: 2013 *18–19 (US Census Bureau, Aug 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/Y3G7-86TA.
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regressive if not targeting struggling neighborhoods directly, for
example, by improving a neighborhood’s access to infrastructure
(such as a new metro stop in a poor neighborhood).29
More generally, public programs that promote access to basic
utilities in developing countries have had difficulty reaching the
neediest populations. Access to energy is often promoted through
price subsidies or unbilled consumption—the paradigmatic
quantity-based subsidies (ones that are proportional to the
amount of the service consumed)—but have been shown to be regressive. One World Bank study bemoaned the “perverse situation, in which higher-income consumers receive benefits they do
not need . . . leaving few or no resources to expand access.”30 Another World Bank study of utility subsidies found that, of the
twenty-six subsidies considered, none were progressive. “The notion that [the studied price subsidies are] inherently pro-poor is
clearly a misconception.”31 Many nonpoor households receive the
subsidy, and many poor households are excluded because they are
not connected to the system from which access—and the subsidy—is drawn. In African countries, this is the pattern found for
water and electricity subsidies: “poor households are less likely
than the population as a whole to have [the] water and electricity
connections” that are necessary to access and enjoy the program.32
In developed countries, this is the pattern with other programs—
like roads and transportation—that are accessed less by the poor,
or from which the poor consume less than the wealthy. In these
countries, road and transportation policies that eliminate free,
open access—for example, collection of tolls—are often found to
be progressive overall.33 A California study estimated that road

29 For example, 73 percent of Metro rail passengers in Washington, DC, have annual
household incomes of $75,000 or more, whereas only 47 percent of bus passengers have
similar incomes. See Steven Ginsberg and Laura Stanton, Would Anyone Win If Metro
Raised Fares? (Wash Post, Sept 16, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/FA5Q-P4M8.
30 Enrique Croussilat, Richard Hamilton, and Pedro Antmann, Addressing the Electricity Access Gap *12 (World Bank, June 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/V4S5-3VAK.
31 Kristin Komives, et al, Water, Electricity, and the Poor: Who Benefits from Utility
Subsidies? *70–71 (World Bank, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/5TR5-UN3A.
32 Id at *77. See also Kristin Komives, Dale Whittington, and Xun Wu, Access to
Utilities by the Poor: A Global Perspective *15–16 (World Institute for Development Economics Research Discussion Paper No 2001/15, June 2001), archived at
http://perma.cc/MS4S-EMSZ.
33 See David Banister, Equity and Acceptability Questions in Internalising the Social
Costs of Transport, in Internalising the Social Costs of Transport 153, 158–60 (European
Conference of Ministers of Transport 1994); Jonas Eliasson and Lars-Göran Mattsson, Equity Effects of Congestion Pricing: Quantitative Methodology and a Case Study for Stockholm,
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tolls reduce the sales tax burden that the lowest income group
would otherwise have to bear.34 Free access to the highways is
thus regressive in the strong sense.
Further, if people of middle income (and up) not only use
transportation more, but also gain a disproportionate connection
through it to income-producing opportunities, thereby crowding
out the poor, then the open roads and transportation policies may
be regressive in the stronger sense, of increasing the overall degree of inequality.35 It is difficult to make this case empirically,
and I suspect that the experience of different localities may vary.36
Indeed, some American cities can be regarded as testaments to
how a system of publicly maintained freeways facilitate urban
flight to suburbs, harming the economic vitality of the central city
and the well-being of its low-income residents.37
Similarly, to access a public library and even more so a museum, people have to appreciate literature and the fine arts, a
trait that is correlated with income, and they have to be part of
social networks that reward fluency in these media. Surely, some
of the services offered by public libraries, like free computer and
Internet access to local residents, are progressive—benefitting
low-income people who may not have similar connectivity at
home.38 But other services, for example, the maintenance of expensive collections of rare works, benefit more the elites.39 If they

40 Transp Rsrch Pt A 602, 604 (2006). For a helpful review of the literature, see generally
David Levinson, Equity Effects of Road Pricing: A Review, 30 Transport Revs 33 (2010).
34 See Schweitzer and Taylor, 35 Transp at 806 (cited in note 27).
35 Todd Litman and Marc Brenman, A New Social Equity Agenda for Sustainable
Transportation *6 (Victoria Transport Policy Institute, Mar 8, 2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/L2E7-7QWJ (“[I]f roads and parking facilities are not financed by user fees
(tolls, parking fees and increased fuel taxes) they must be financed by general taxes and
building rents that everybody pays regardless of how much they drive, which is unfair and
regressive.”).
36 Kristin Komives and her coauthors argued that, although the utility subsidies in
the states they studied were regressive, “they are less regressive than the distribution of
income in the states. This finding indicates that the subsidies contribute to reducing inequality, even when the distribution of subsidy benefits is regressive.” Komives, et al, Water,
Electricity, and the Poor at *143 (cited in note 31).
37 See Joe T. Darden, et al, Detroit: Race and Uneven Development xi (Temple 1987)
(noting that “the economic decline of central cities and the economic rise of the suburbs
[was] a redistribution facilitated by the massive construction of interstate highways”).
38 See Thom File and Camille Ryan, Computer and Internet Use in the United States:
2013 *4–5 (US Census Bureau, Nov 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/NN2K-3UDP
(showing that low-income families are less likely to have a computer or Internet access in
their homes).
39 See Paul J. DiMaggio, The Museum and the Public, in Martin Feldstein, ed, The
Economics of Art Museums 39, 39–41 (Chicago 1991); Juan Prieto-Rodríguez and Víctor
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are funded largely by wealthy philanthropists, museums may be
regressive only in the weak sense—benefitting the affluent more,
without increasing inequality. However, tax credits for the philanthropic class are a form of public expenditure, constituting a
transfer from the general budget that funds all programs to the
budget of cultural institutions that cater largely to the well-to-do,
well-educated patrons.40
C. Sources of Access Handicaps
The theoretical case laid out in Section A and the examples
in Section B reveal a phenomenon that is sometimes called “access handicap”41—when some groups are systematically less likely
to enter and utilize open sites. What are these access handicaps?
What are the impediments that afflict some groups, stopping
them from exercising their access rights? This Section explores
the systematic access handicaps that prevent some groups from
fully utilizing their access rights.
1. Cost handicaps: Implicit nonprice fees.
A site may be free to enter but costly to reach. The example
above of a remotely located but publicly funded national park involves an implicit screening fee—the cost of travel to reach the
park.42 Free higher education (in places where it is the norm) may
require enormous private costs to qualify. Chinese elite universities, for example, are heavily subsidized. But the selection process
is so demanding that Chinese families spend years and enormous

Fernández-Blanco, Optimal Pricing and Grant Policies for Museums, 30 J Cultural Econ
169, 169–70 (2006).
40 See Alan L. Feld, Michael O’Hare, and J. Mark Davidson Schuster, Patrons despite
Themselves: Taxpayers and Arts Policy 75 (NYU 1983); Alan L. Feld, Revisiting Tax Subsidies for Cultural Institutions, 32 J Cultural Econ 275, 276 (2008); Michael Rushton, Who
Pays? Who Benefits? Who Decides?, 32 J Cultural Econ 293, 295 (2008).
41 Komives, et al, Water, Electricity, and the Poor at *60–61 (cited in note 31).
42 See David Scott and Wayne Munson, Perceived Constraints to Park Usage among
Individuals with Low Incomes, 12 J Park & Recreation Administration 79, 84, 91 (Winter
1994); Jin-Hyung Lee, David Scott, and Myron F. Floyd, Structural Inequalities in Outdoor
Recreation Participation: A Multiple Hierarchy Stratification Perspective, 33 J Leisure
Rsrch 427, 443 (2001). For discussions of the sensitivity of lower-income people to usage
fees, see Thomas More and Thomas Stevens, Do User Fees Exclude Low-Income People
from Resource-Based Recreation?, 32 J Leisure Rsrch 341, 351–52 (2000); Stephen D. Reiling,
Hsiang-Tai Cheng, and Cheryl Trott, Measuring the Discriminatory Impact Associated
with Higher Recreational Fees, 14 Leisure Sci 121, 137 (1992); J. Bishop Grewell, The Ethics of Recreation Fees: Slamming the Door on Low-Income People?, 22 PERC Rep 7, 8 (Mar
2004), archived at http://perma.cc/FA6V-RG7E.
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resources to pass the entry tests.43 Those unable to afford the implicit eligibility fee are disproportionately handicapped.
Here, the “open” and “free” attributes are technically correct
(there is no ticket office at the gate of the park, nor a full tuition
bill at the Chinese elite university). But it is functionally false. In
deciding whether to pursue the freely accessed good, people face
nonzero costs of arrival at the open gates or of qualifying for free
entry, and these costs may vary across different groups both in
magnitude and affordability. Sometimes these costs favor the
poor. For example, the additional costs may be measured by time:
how long the entrant is willing to stand in the queue. In such
cases, free access is deployed more by those with low alternative
cost of time, namely, the relatively poor.44 But other times these
costs are stacked against the poor, especially when they require
expenditure of disposable income.
To be sure, part of an effective access justice policy may be
the subsidization of the implicit nonprice fees. If, in order to enjoy
open access to higher education, people have to spend years on
costly preparation, prep schools can be subsidized. Ironically, this
logic can also be turned on its head: implicit nonprice fees can be
strategically mounted on some populations (primarily weak populations) to reduce their access to the otherwise–free and open
forum. Voter ID laws, which require a registration process that is
relatively costless for the upper- and middle-class but costly for
the poor, are a strategic impediment because of their particular
effect on poor populations.45
2. Network handicaps: Connectedness to a grid.
Another form of pre-access impediment is membership in a
network. To enjoy some forms of open access, people have to be
43

Keith Bradsher, In China, Families Bet It All on College for Their Children (NY
Times, Feb 16, 2013), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/17/business/in-china
-families-bet-it-all-on-a-child-in-college.html (visited Feb 12, 2016) (Perma archive
unavailable).
44 See Jon Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens 73–76 (Russell Sage 1992).
45 See Crawford v Marion County Election Board, 472 F3d 949, 955 (7th Cir 2007)
(Evans dissenting) (arguing that the voter ID law in question would impact the ability of
the poor and elderly to vote); Frank v Walker, 773 F3d 783, 785 (7th Cir 2014) (Posner
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), quoting Citizens without Proof: A Survey of
Americans’ Possession of Documentary Proof of Citizenship and Photo Identification *2–3
(Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, Nov 2006), archived at
http://perma.cc/7NSF-5X4U (noting that the poor, the elderly, and minorities are less
likely to have documents allowing them to comply with voter ID laws).

2016]

The Paradox of Access Justice

1773

connected to the network through which the benefits are distributed. For example, to enjoy the many benefits from open services
on the Internet one needs to be connected to the Internet. To enjoy
“access to knowledge” one has to join a community of users that
gain the access. At an even more basic level, immigrants may be
deprived of access because they are not part of the language
“network.”
A painful reminder of the connectedness-to-a-network handicap comes from an important access justice policy—projects
providing people with subsidized utilities (like water and electricity). In developing countries, utility subsidies benefitted least those
who need them most—poor people in remote areas—because of the
low rates of network connectedness among the very poor.46 If the
electricity grid does not reach your village, cheap subsidized electricity is not going to benefit you. Likewise, the benefits of public
roads and public transportation flow to communities connected by
the commuter network, not to remote and unconnected areas.
When connectedness to a network is the access handicap, access justice would be better served by expanding the network, rather than subsidizing the goods and services that flow through it.
Expenditures in expanding a network directly benefit new entrants who are brought in, who could be selected based on need.
(Benefits also flow indirectly to incumbents in the network, due
to “network externalities.”)47 By contrast, subsidies of the services
flowing through the network benefit only the incumbents.
3. Information handicap: Understanding the access
privilege.
Access may be deployed differentially because of information
costs. People may be able to gain access without any implicit fee
and without having to join a formal network or grid, but free access may nevertheless be worthless to them if they don’t know
about it or if they don’t understand why it might benefit them.
The information about open access has to be disseminated to
all potential beneficiaries. But people have different exposures to
such information and different abilities to process it. I will show
below examples of mandated health insurance benefits that are
46 See text accompanying notes 31–32. Another area in which connectedness to a
network is key to access justice is Internet connection. See text accompanying notes 6 and 38.
47 For a brief description of network externalities, see David Bardey, Helmuth
Cremer, and Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, Competition in Two-Sided Markets with Common
Network Externalities, 44 Rev Indust Org 327, 328 (2014).
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available, and potentially beneficial, to all policyholders, but that
are not utilized by some. To understand the ins and outs of a
health insurance plan, the beneficiary needs to read lengthy and
complex documents with numerous instructions about how to utilize the different benefits. Lawmakers may make heroic efforts to
simplify such guides and manuals, but the complex is often hard
to simplify.48 And so some benefits may go unused, despite the
access justice policy that brought them into the plans in the first
place.
Even educated people may succumb to information handicaps. Who can master every detail in her health and dental plan?
Do you—sophisticated legal readers—know how often your vision
plan entitles you to a new pair of glasses, and under what terms?49
Later (in Part II), I will discuss in detail the mechanics of access
to courts, an access justice policy that depends in part on people
reading and responding to information and disclosures. For consumers, access to courts is practiced through class actions, but
joining the class litigation and receiving redress through it is conditional on reading and understanding technical information notices that most people tend to overlook.50
While the complexity of access justice rules affects everybody,
it is no surprise that it affects less educated and less sophisticated
consumers more severely. Even if the structure of an access justice program is simplified, literacy, numeracy, and experience operate as sorting devices, filtering out the less sophisticated.51
True, access to education (through subsidized schooling) could potentially help close the gaps in the information handicap between
the rich and the poor. But, as I will illustrate below, some of the
48 See Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know:
The Failure of Mandated Disclosure 121–37 (Princeton 2014).
49 See, for example, Benefits: Vision Plans (The University of Chicago Human Resources, Jan 27, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/T8CF-BEF8.
50 The information available suggests that the response rate is quite low. See Do
Class Actions Benefit Class Members: An Empirical Analysis of Class Actions *2 (Mayer
Brown LLP), archived at http://perma.cc/V5UX-KCM7 (stating that settlements delivered
funds to between 0.000006 percent and 12 percent of class members). See also Debra Lyn
Bassett, Class Action Silence, 94 BU L Rev 1781, 1796 (2014).
51 See Sean F. Reardon, Rachel A. Valentino, and Kenneth A. Shores, Patterns of
Literacy among U.S. Students, 22 Future Children 17, 26 (Fall 2012), archived at http://
perma.cc/2LLU-ZJV7 (describing a large discrepancy in literacy rates based on income and
noting that, for students born in 2000, those from families in the ninetieth percentile of
income had literacy rates 1.25 standard deviations higher than those from families in the
tenth percentile); Irwin S. Kirsch, et al, Adult Literacy in America: A First Look at the
Findings of the National Adult Literacy Survey *60–61 (National Center for Education
Statistics, Apr 2002), archived at http://perma.cc/6TR7-5W3N.
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programs that intend to provide better access to information and
education, and which are intended to reduce the information
handicap, are themselves bootstrapped by this and other access
handicaps—namely, by the fact that one needs to know about the
availability of the access program, and be able to overcome other
impediments to access.52 Worse still, some of these programs that
purport to provide information equally and openly to all backfire
and increase, rather than reduce, the inequality in access utilization. If the information is more legible and useful to the educated,
handing out such information may exacerbate the regressivity.
For example, providing good disclosures about quality of hospitals
may help sophisticated patients make better hospital choices,
crowding out the less sophisticated and relegating them to lowerquality medical care.53
Closely related to the information problem is the cognitive
function handicap. It is no secret that people sometimes make
poor decisions because of cognitive biases and judgment error.
Here, too, there is evidence that poor people perform worse and
“behave in less capable ways.”54 People who experience ongoing
material strain are more cognitively taxed and thus exhibit more
mental scarcity, leading to decision errors.55 Access opportunities
that require some measure of decisional sophistication to realize
thus fall prey to the cognitive function handicap.
4. Benefit handicaps: The differential value of access.
Even if free or subsidized access is truly accessible to all, unobstructed by the cost, network, or information handicap, not everyone will exercise it equally. Some people may derive more benefit

52

See notes 104–09 and accompanying text.
See Lawrence P. Casalino, et al, Will Pay-for-Performance and Quality Reporting
Affect Health Care Disparities?, 26 Health Aff w405, w409 (2007), online at http://
content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/3/w405.full.pdf (visited Aug 24, 2016) (Perma archive
unavailable); Dana B. Mukamel, et al, Quality Report Cards, Selection of Cardiac Surgeons, and Racial Disparities: A Study of the Publication of the New York State Cardiac
Surgery Reports, 41 Inquiry 435, 443–45 (2004); David Dranove, et al, Is More Information
Better? The Effects of “Report Cards” on Health Care Providers, 111 J Polit Econ 555, 581–
83 (2003).
54 Anandi Mani, et al, Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function, 341 Sci 976, 976 (2013).
See also generally Anuj K. Shah, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Eldar Shafir, Some Consequences of Having Too Little, 338 Sci 682 (2012); Sendhil Mullainathan and Eldar Shafir,
Scarcity: Why Having Too Little Means So Much (Times Books 2013).
55 See Justin S. White and William H. Dow, Intertemporal Choices for Health, in
Christina A. Roberto and Ichiro Kawachi, eds, Behavioral Economics and Public Health
27, 62 (Oxford 2016).
53
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from the access justice program because they need it more. And
conversely, others may need it less.
Policies intended to improve physical access to facilities for
people with disabilities are intended to have such differential benefit and are rightly celebrated for these selective effects. In fact,
they sometimes deliberately exclude others from deploying the access program and even punish them if they do—for example, in
the case of handicap parking spaces.56
Many other facially neutral access justice policies suffer from
varying utilization rates due to differential benefits across users.
City parks with playgrounds are worth more to families with kids;
open and subsidized higher education is worth more to people who
graduate from high school; and accessible insurance is worth
more to people with high losses. For example, programs of access
to disaster relief (or to subsidized disaster insurance) benefit everyone who succumbs to an otherwise-uncompensated disaster,
and in the abstract they appear neutral. But in effect these programs are more valuable to people who live in disaster-prone areas. All victims of severe weather disasters may qualify for some
form of free government relief or subsidized flood insurance, but
people living in the predicted paths of storms benefit more.57
5. Affordability handicaps: The effect of small fees.
Access justice is sometimes implemented through free-ofcharge entry. But problems of moral hazard may lead to inefficient deployment that would make the program too costly. When,
for example, access to medicine is implemented by distribution of
drugs free of any charge, people may hoard medications unnecessarily, at great cost to the providers and to taxpayers.58 Similarly,
when people receive ambulance or emergency care services for

56 See, for example, 625 ILCS 5/11-1301.3 (mandating fines for those who, without
authorization, park in spots reserved for persons with disabilities); Disabled Parking
FAQ’s for Law Enforcement (Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/JJ4A-N98W (stating that individual jurisdictions can issue tickets of $100
to $300 for parking in a handicap space without a placard).
57 See Part I.D.3.a. See also generally Omri Ben-Shahar and Kyle D. Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather Insurance, 68 Stan L Rev 571 (2016).
58 Consider Merrill Goozner, New Medicare Rule Aims to Curb Waste and Fraud in Medical Equipment Business (Wash Post, Mar 24, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/Z3V4-J3KL.
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free, the services may be deployed excessively.59 This moral hazard may occur in other areas as well. If, for example, enrollment
in public universities is free of any tuition charge, people may enroll in programs of study even when they generate little probability of private success and low social value.60
The inefficiency and waste arising from such free-of-charge
access justice programs often lead to the implementation of some
cost sharing or co-payments—small fees that purport to shift a
tolerable burden to those who make the decision to access the program. The fees have to be large enough to reduce the moral hazard, but not too large to make the program unaffordable.
But even token prices may filter out many users, especially
the poorest, for whom any minor cash price may be burdensome.
This result has been abundantly documented in health care and
prescription drug policy.61 The same result, of shutting down the
very poor from gaining access, has also been suggested in the context of rent control—a prominent access justice policy that seeks
to improve access to housing among low-income renters and to
promote mixed-income communities. Most rent control policies
decrease but do not eliminate rent payments. Thus, the poorest
renters may still be unable to afford the reduced rent payments.
This prevents the program from having the desired effect on the
target population. Although the distributive effects of rent control
are debated and may vary across cities, a substantial literature
has documented a disturbing distributive effect of rent control:
the beneficiaries are often more sophisticated and economically
stronger than the intended population.62 The regressive effects of
59 See Aaron L. Schwartz, et al, Measuring Low-Value Care in Medicare, 174 JAMA
Internal Med 1067, 1073 (2014) (finding that one-quarter of Medicare patients have received unnecessary treatment that was likely to provide little benefit).
60 See Efficiency and Effectiveness of Public Expenditure on Tertiary Education in
the EU *17–23 (European Commission), archived at http://perma.cc/MZ4N-W6Q9.
61 See Michael Chernew, et al, Effects of Increased Patient Cost Sharing on Socioeconomic Disparities in Health Care, 23 J Gen Internal Med 1131, 1134–35 (2008); Sujha
Subramanian, Impact of Medicaid Copayments on Patients with Cancer: Lessons for Medicaid Expansion under Health Reform, 49 Med Care 842, 844 (2011); Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy *338–66 (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, Mar
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/3QKS-Y9YY.
62 See Richard Arnott, Time for Revisionism on Rent Control?, 9 J Econ Persp 99, 108
(Winter 1995); Edward L. Glaeser, Does Rent Control Reduce Segregation? *9 (Harvard
Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No 1985, Nov 1, 2002), archived at
http://perma.cc/7RJW-6SJL. See also Joseph Gyourko and Peter Linneman, Equity and
Efficiency Aspects of Rent Control: An Empirical Study of New York City, 26 J Urban Econ
54, 64 (1989) (finding that lower-income residents benefitted at slightly higher levels, but
that “poor benefit targeting” reduced this benefit).
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some rent control policies may be due to more than the affordability handicap. They may be due to the information handicap—
some people are less competent at understanding how to jump the
queue and secure the coveted scarce benefit. Or, even more cynically, they may be due to a variant of a network handicap—being
outside a social or political network that helps secure the benefit.63 But affordability may nevertheless explain some of the selection pattern.
The affordability handicap can be found elsewhere. For example, it may be a concern in consumer-protection law.64 Laws
mandating consumer rights—whether these are access rights or
other universal nondisclaimable protections—can have price effects that are negligible for some but meaningful for others. If
people have different price-quality tradeoffs, the higher quality
obtained by mandated rights may price out the bargain basement
shoppers who prefer low-quality, low-price bundles.
These patterns explain the access handicap. While providing
some order to the universe of access justice policies and generating some testable predictions regarding the prevalence of the regressive effect, my account above falls short of a “theory” of differential access. The argument that access policies may be regressive
follows inductive reasoning, rather than first-principles logic. Its
force depends on the prevalence of evidence supporting it. For example, access to government disaster relief may be progressive if
it goes to low-income victims (as is often the case with tornados
destroying mobile homes in Tornado Alley or in low-lying areas
along the Mississippi River), but it may be regressive if it goes to
higher-income victims (as is often the case with hurricanes damaging high-end waterfront property). There is nothing inherent in
the type of relief that determines its regressive consequences. Its
redistributive bottom line depends on the relative incidence of
storms in poor and rich areas. In general, then, the various access
justice policies create different sets of winners and losers. As the

63 See, for example, Jim Edwards, No, Rent Control Does Not Work–It Actually Benefits the Rich and Hurts the Poor (Business Insider, Sept 3, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/6T4C-AFXZ (describing how personal connections can be crucial to a buyer
seeking a rent-controlled apartment); Scott James, How Rent Control Subsidizes San
Francisco’s Super-Rich (Bay Citizen, Feb 16, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/37YB
-XTNV (describing how tenants’ political clout helps to cement San Francisco’s rent control
policies).
64 Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulatory Techniques in Consumer Protection:
A Critique of European Consumer Contract Law, 50 Common Mkt L Rev 109, 113–15 (2013).
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factors just described in this Section come into play, the winners
are less likely to be drawn from the poor.
D. Regressive Legal Institutions
We have seen that access justice programs may be regressive
when their benefits accrue disproportionately to sophisticated or
affluent groups. The examples drawn out thus far focused on fiscal and budgetary allocations, whereby the government uses its
funding powers to allocate benefits. This Section moves on to examine a different type of access justice intervention—accomplished through legal institutions and mandates. These are policies in which the government does not directly produce a public
good (as, say, in the examples of parks and education). Instead,
the distributive effects of the policies discussed below occur indirectly, through the costs and benefits arising from legal rules.
1. Mandated disclosure.
Mandated disclosure is a regulatory technique requiring one
party to the transaction to provide information to the other party
so that the other party can make a better decision. It does not
regulate the decisions or the choices that people make; it regulates only the distribution of information. Mandated disclosure is
an access-to-information policy that requires truthful, often comprehensive, information to be served out in equal portions. All
consumers get the same warnings, the same disclosure forms, and
the same data to fuel their informed consent.65
Mandated disclosure is broadly intended to protect weaker
populations. Disclosures are routinely enacted in response to
trouble stories in which ordinary citizens suffered misfortune.
Lawmakers often brandish the specific travails of a working class
or low-income person to punctuate the utility of the proposed
disclosure mandate for similar folks who are not sophisticated or
fortunate enough to obtain the necessary information absent a
mandate.66
But free and equal access to information does not mean equal
utilization of it. Building on the conceptual framework developed
above, it is the information handicap that limits the use of mandated disclosures. Anatole France remarked bitingly about “the
65 See Ben-Shahar and Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know at 3–6 (cited in
note 48).
66 See id at 138–43.
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majestic equality of the laws, which forbid rich and poor alike to
sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their
bread.”67 The majestic equality of disclosure fades when filtered
through the information handicap. The information being disclosed has to be sought, noticed, read, understood, processed, and
then used in a way that improves decisions and outcomes. In each
one of these steps, the poor and poorly educated benefit less than
the wealthy and the educated. The very people whose troubles led
to the enactment of disclosure mandates are least likely to benefit
from them.
Medical informed consent forms—one of the crown jewels of
the mandated disclosure paradigm—illustrate this pattern. Consent forms are required by law to be fully detailed, so that all risks
posed to patients or to human research subjects will be transparent. Even if drafted in lay language, these forms are complex,
mostly written at a literacy level exceeding that of poor and unsophisticated patients.68
Similarly, consumer financial disclosures require some financial education and savvy to be useful. “Evidence from studies of
consumer credit disclosure rules suggests that it is better-off consumers who tend to make use of information.”69 “The poor may
rationally decide not to make use of information, if they feel no
alternatives will be available to them.”70 Better-educated (and
wealthier) consumers know better how to search for information,
understand it, ask questions about it, comparison shop, and receive better advice with it.71
67

Anatole France, The Red Lily 95 (John Lane 5th ed 1916) (Winifred Stephens,
trans) (Frederic Chapman, ed).
68 See S. Michael Sharp, Consent Documents for Oncology Trials: Does Anybody Read
These Things?, 27 Am J Clinical Oncology 570, 570 (2004) (“[S]tudies have found that consent documents are long and complicated to the point that the average person in the
United States is likely to find them difficult to read.”); Angela Fagerlin, et al, Patient Education Materials about the Treatment of Early-Stage Prostate Cancer: A Critical Review,
140 Annals Internal Med 721, 726–27 (2004); Stuart A. Grossman, Steven Piantadosi, and
Charles Covahey, Are Informed Consent Forms That Describe Clinical Oncology Research
Protocols Readable by Most Patients and Their Families?, 12 J Clinical Oncology 2211,
2212 (1994).
69 Geraint Howells, The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information, 32 J L & Society 349, 357 (2005).
70 Id at 358. See also William C. Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in
Consumer Transactions, 1973 Wis L Rev 400, 443–44 (“[I]f too much information is put on
the label, it will look like the fine print in a contract and undoubtedly be ignored by most
consumers.”).
71 See Barbara O’Neill, Barbara Bristow, and Patricia Q. Brennan, MONEY 2000
Participants: Who Are They?, 37 J Extension (Feb 1999), archived at http://perma.cc/28D4
-UWLF; Howells, 32 J L & Society at 357–58 (cited in note 69).
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Mandated disclosures not only benefit the more educated and
more sophisticated recipients, but, in an unintended way, can
worsen the relative situation of weaker groups.72 There are some
disturbing instances in which this phenomenon has been empirically documented. For example, hospitals must disclose report
cards—scores that measure the quality of treatment they provide,
most often mortality rates. There is some evidence that these
mandates led hospitals to improve the reported dimensions, but
there are also discouraging findings that the disclosure hurt the
sicker and poorer patients. Healthier and more sophisticated patients found their way to higher-rated hospitals and to better
overall medical care, while sicker and poorer patients were
treated in hospitals with worse grades. This results in “marginal
health benefits for healthy patients, and major adverse health
consequences for sicker patients.”73 The potential harm to poorer,
sicker patients is due to their relative disadvantage in the “arms
race” to obtain the benefits of superior medicine that disclosures
reveal. If the best hospitals have limited capacity, those with
handicapped access to the information about hospital quality will
suffer a systematic disadvantage in medical outcomes.
Mandated disclosure can be harmful to the poor in another,
subtler way. In consumer credit markets, the poor face shadier
lending practices, have less financial savvy, and are more vulnerable to marketing traps. The main protection they have is the network of antifraud regulations disciplining the conduct of subprime lenders.74 These are state and federal laws that identify
particular patterns of deception and abuse and provide remedies
for the abused parties. Disclosures, however, undermine these
protections. Why? Because compliance with disclosure mandates
creates a veneer of legality, a presumption against fraud. Almost
by definition, there cannot be fraud or deception when the lender
made all the information accessible and carefully lavished on the

72 See Kenneth McNeil, et al, Market Discrimination against the Poor and the Impact
of Consumer Disclosure Laws: The Used Car Industry, 13 L & Society Rev 695, 699 (1979);
Ben-Shahar and Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know at 176–80 (cited in note 48).
73 Dranove, et al, 111 J Polit Econ at 577 (cited in note 53).
74 Paul M. Schwartz, Note, Where Do We Go from Here? The Battle against Predatory
Subprime Lending, 3 Brooklyn J Corp, Fin & Comm L 213, 231 (2008) (discussing the state
and federal remedies for victims of predatory lending).
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debtor all the mandated disclosures required by the Truth in
Lending Act75 and its satellites.76
And so, access justice—here, the alluring ideal of equal access
to information—replaces and substitutes for the fraud claim a
ruffled consumer would otherwise have. The protection that
would otherwise be accorded through antifraud legislation is thus
diminished. Sophisticated consumers are less troubled by this
substitution effect because they are not confronted with the same
predatory lending schemes. They are better educated and better
advised, they can sniff the aroma of deception, and they can safeguard against questionable solicitations by asking better questions or taking their patronage elsewhere. They can fall back on
more robust informal networks of advice and reputation. It is
therefore the poor who suffer disproportionately from the crippling of antifraud and antideception laws.
2. Mandated compensation.
Tort and products liability, and other remedial rules in private law, guarantee people’s access to remedy—an equal right to
all victims to be made “whole” according to the same formula. This
is a crucial ingredient in some conceptions of access justice because meaningful redress of injuries protects either those who are
“excluded from the market or [ ] those who face difficulties in
making use of the market freedoms.”77 But, like many minimumquality terms, mandated compensation can have differential effects across consumers, which can lead to cross-subsidies
whereby poor consumers subsidize the compensation of wealthier consumers.78
Mandated compensation can fail to generate protective benefits to weak consumers because of the utility handicap and the
affordability handicap. Consider first the utility handicap. Tort

75

Pub L No 90-321, 82 Stat 146 (1968), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1601 et seq.
See Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Web Site Disclosure
of e-Standard Terms Backfire?, in Omri Ben-Shahar, ed, Boilerplate: The Foundation of
Market Contracts 83, 92–93 (Cambridge 2007); Riensche v Cingular Wireless LLC, 2006
WL 3827477, *6–9 (WD Wash); Williams v First Government Mortgage and Investors Corp,
225 F3d 738, 751–52 (DC Cir 2000) (affirming the denial of the plaintiff’s Truth in Lending
Act claim given the lender’s adequate disclosure of the agreement’s terms).
77 Hans-W. Micklitz, Social Justice and Access Justice in Private Law *2 (European
University Institute Working Paper No LAW 2011/02, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/
M4TD-MAZU.
78 Charles Fried and David Rosenberg, Making Tort Law: What Should Be Done and
Who Should Do It 71 (AEI 2003).
76
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compensation for injuries arising from defective products requires
manufacturers to pay for the losses suffered by victims. The cost
of this liability regime is spread to all consumers through the increased price of products. How much each victim gets in compensation depends on how large her losses are, and—not surprisingly—the measurable losses to the poor tend to be smaller than
those that accrue to the wealthy. Property-rich and high-income
consumers receive greater awards, because damages in tort law
are correlated with lost income and with consequential harm to
property.79
If, hypothetically, these property-rich and high-income consumers had to buy private insurance for their idiosyncratic losses,
they would be charged premiums commensurate with their
higher expected losses, and the cross-subsidy would be avoided.
This is the most basic feature of private insurance markets: if you
insure against larger losses—for example, when the insured asset
is a more valuable home or a larger earning capacity—you pay
more for the coverage. But products liability law bundles the insurance component with the product purchase and the product
price, preventing differentiation of the premiums. In most retail
circumstances, sellers lack the ability to discriminate ex ante in
price between different groups of consumers according to characteristics such as wealth or propensity toward getting into accidents (although for some products, like high- or low-end automobiles, some separation occurs because these products are
targeting different income niches). As a result, all customers end
up paying an equal implicit premium for the right to get the bundled insurance coverage—in the form of a higher product price.
Poorer consumers with smaller expected losses thus cross-subsidize
the broader de facto coverage of wealthier consumers engaging in
the same activity or consuming the same product.80
79 This point has been made previously by many writers. See, for example, Richard
L. Abel, A Critique of American Tort Law, 8 Brit J L & Society 199, 202–03 (1981) (noting
that “the quantum of damages preserves, and indeed amplifies, the present unequal distribution of wealth and income”); George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 Yale L J 1297, 1350–51 (1981); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis
and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L J 1521, 1546, 1559–60 (1987); Alan Schwartz, Proposals
for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 Yale L J 353, 405–06 (1988);
Walter Y. Oi, The Economics of Product Safety: A Rejoinder, 5 Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci
689, 690 (1974); James R. Garven, Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Tort Liability,
28 J Insurance Issues 1, 6 (2005).
80 See Priest, 96 Yale L J at 1546, 1559–60 (cited in note 79); James Henderson,
Revising Section 402A: The Limits of Tort as Social Insurance, 10 Touro L Rev 107, 119
(1993) (emphasizing that tort liability “is a miserable flop as a social insurance system”).
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Despite my optimism regarding unbundled insurance markets, a similar pattern of cross-subsidization can occur when mandated compensation schemes are infused into insurance law. For
example, auto insurance is widely viewed as a scheme intended
to guarantee a cushion of compensation to victims of auto accidents.81 Higher policy limits cost more, but provide more recovery
for all victims. Drivers may not wish to purchase high liability
limits, but the law requires them to do so in order to accord access
to compensation to their victims. But who, among the potential
victims, benefits more from drivers’ generous insurance? Interestingly, advocates for low-income minority groups argued against
mandatory make-whole auto insurance policies.82 They realized
that when the injured plaintiffs are poor, their recoveries are
smaller. This is because their lost wages are lower, lawyers are
harder for them to find, and jurors are less likely to return high
awards. Thus, in the grand scheme, poorer populations benefit
less from high-limit auto insurance, but nevertheless pay the
same premiums to drive. Accordingly, their advocates even went
as far as aligning with insurers in proposing low-cost, no-frills
auto insurance policy options designed for low-income drivers.
Those choices would have allowed people to opt out of the general
pool and establish a separate insurance pool, with lower premiums. Partitioned from the general pool (and its associated higher
coverage benefits), they would cease to cross-subsidize their more
affluent fellow drivers and victims. Ironically, consumer activists
like Ralph Nader successfully campaigned against the partitioned
two-tier choice, invoking the logic and the rhetoric of access justice. Nader alleged that the low-coverage option “would unfairly
deprive the poor of their right to be fully compensated for pain
and suffering” and that it “dehumanized the poor and deprived
them of their equal rights.”83

81 See, for example, Kenneth S. Abraham, The Liability Century: Insurance and Tort
Law from the Progressive Era to 9/11 70–72 (Harvard 2008); Shauhin Talesh, Insurance
Law as Public Interest Law, 2 UC Irvine L Rev 985, 996–97 (2012) (“[M]andatory automobile insurance laws serve the public interest by making drivers financially responsible to
others they injure in an accident and are now treated as a necessary cost of living in the
United States.”).
82 James M. Anderson, Paul Heaton, and Stephen J. Carroll, The U.S. Experience
with No-Fault Automobile Insurance: A Retrospective 52–53 (RAND 2010) (recounting the
efforts of these advocates).
83 Id at 53–54. See also Kenneth Reich, Nader Draws Criticism by Consumers for NoFault View (LA Times, May 28, 1989), archived at http://perma.cc/7PC5-7CXM.
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These examples point to the utility handicap as the source of
the regressive distribution effect of mandated compensation policies—different groups gaining different value from the benefit.
But the affordability handicap may also account for the differential value. For some low-income consumers, the price increase of
the product that now contains a more generous remedy or insurance component might make the entire activity—the purchase of
the product or the driving of a car—prohibitively costly. They exit
the market and no longer cross-subsidize their more affluent fellow consumers. But the adverse effect on them is no less troubling. It is the denial of an even more important access—the equal
access to product markets and the participation in the primary
activity.84
3. Mandated insurance.
The auto accidents and products liability examples above illustrate a more general phenomenon of mandatory equal access
to insurance: elites benefit more from indemnity, even though it
is equally available to all. A similar pattern can be traced in other
insurance schemes, in which the social policy of access justice is
driven by egalitarian concerns but in fact embodies a regressive
redistribution. Let me demonstrate it through two examples:
property insurance and health insurance.
a) Property insurance. Consider the widely prevalent public
programs providing access to affordable homeowner’s insurance in
areas exposed to severe weather. The high risk of storms and of
catastrophic loss means high, sometimes unaffordable, premiums.
Political pressure thus builds for government intervention that
would make insurance and home ownership accessible to middleand lower-income people. Subsidized insurance is viewed as an important ingredient in access justice because insurance is required
to obtain a mortgage loan, and its affordability can determine the
path to home ownership. This is why flood insurance, for example,
is provided with significant subsidies by the federal government

84 For similar arguments on compensation in contract law and the redistributive effect of consequential damages, see Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation,
and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S Cal L Rev 629, 659–60 (1988) (discussing how,
when a single price is charged, “buyers who had inherently low risks would be paying a
premium to cover the potential liability to buyers who had inherently high risks”); Gwyn
D. Quillen, Note, Contract Damages and Cross-Subsidization, 61 S Cal L Rev 1125, 1129–
32 (1988).
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through the National Flood Insurance Program.85 This is also why
many states that experience severe weather, like Florida, set regulatory caps on premiums for homeowner’s insurance, and why
some have state-funded insurance companies whose public purpose is to “provide property insurance protection . . . to those who
are, in good faith, entitled to obtain coverage through the private
market but are unable to do so.”86
This is the rhetoric of access justice. When establishing such
programs and voting to fund them, the ideal of access justice engenders bipartisan support, justified by “our moral duty to the
poorest people and working people and lower middle income people.”87 Billions of dollars of subsidies are justified, according to one
lawmaker, to prevent working families, who are “doing everything they can to put food on the table,” from losing their homes.88
But the reality, despite this progressive rhetoric, is disappointingly regressive, and largely due to the problem that I classified
as the utility handicap. The government subsidies for insurance
accrue foremost to homeowners in the highest-risk areas—in
coastal communities. These are also the higher-value properties,
owned by the affluent who desire and who can afford the luxury
of proximity to the beach.89 Because the deficit between premiums
and payouts has to be paid by all taxpayers (or all policyholders,
including those located inland in lower-risk, lower-value, lowerincome areas), the subsidized insurance benefits the wealthier
households at the expense of others.
In a separate coauthored study, I estimated the regressive
effect of Florida’s state-subsidized property insurance program.
The study found a strong positive correlation between wealth and
85 See, for example, Flood Insurance: FEMA’s Rate-Setting Process Warrants Attention *6–7 (GAO, Oct 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/GT46-PLGV (“Congress mandated
the use of subsidized premiums to encourage communities to join the program and mitigate concerns that charging rates that fully and accurately reflected flood risk would be a
burden to some property owners.”).
86 Who We Are (Citizens Property Insurance Corporation), archived at http://
perma.cc”/F7QH-74H2.
87 National Flood Insurance Program Enhanced Borrowing Authority Act of 2005,
HR 3669, 109th Cong, 1st Sess, in 151 Cong Rec 19751 (Sept 8, 2005) (statement of Rep
Frank). See also Rick Lazio, Flood Fund Aids Working-Class Homeowners (NY Times, Nov
18, 1993), online at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/18/opinion/l-flood-fund-aids-working
-class-homeowners-535993.html (visited Aug 24, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable).
88 Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, S 1926, 113th Cong, 2d
Sess, in 160 Cong Rec S 581 (daily ed Jan 29, 2014) (statement of Sen Heitkamp).
89 See Value of Properties in the National Flood Insurance Program *2 (Congressional Budget Office, June 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/AVG4-5XDP (noting the extremely high values of subsidized coastal properties).
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insurance subsidy. It turns out that a 1 percent increase in a
household’s value is associated with roughly a 1 percent increase
in the subsidy. Simply put, if Eve’s home is worth twice as much
as Adam’s, Eve enjoys on average twice the absolute subsidy—$2
for every $1 that Adam gets.90
While my main concern in discussing this example of subsidized property insurance is to show the unintended redistributive
effect of access justice, this is the moment in the Article when I
digress and make a comment on social waste. The cross-subsidy
that government-provided insurance creates not only redistributes resources in favor of the affluent coastal residents and at the
expense of others, but also energizes the rapid development along
the riskiest, most erosion-prone, coastal areas.91 In a little less
than two generations, the population living in coastal Florida increased fourfold, by ten million people. Coastal exposure now represents 79 percent of all property exposure in the state, with an
insured value of $2.9 trillion.92 You’d think that frequent hurricanes would chill the rate of development, right? Not in the slightest (why should they, if insurance is filthy cheap?). The path that
Hurricane Andrew blazed along the Florida coast in 1992, at the
time leaving $25 billion in losses, has been so lushly redeveloped
that the same storm would now cause more than double the
losses, estimated by a congressional report at $55 billion in 2005
(holding constant the value of building material and real estate,
as well as other societal changes).93 Access justice, in this case,
was in large part an invitation to more affluent Americans to
move to the land of subsidy.
b) Health insurance. In the homeowner’s insurance example (and previously in the discussion of auto insurance), the elite
had larger losses and thus received more de facto coverage for the
same subsidized price. But the access handicap of insurance can
accrue for a different reason: the lower propensity to invoke the
benefits. This effect could occur in the area of health insurance.
Poor people are more sensitive to co-payments (affordability
handicap) and to other nonprice fees (cost handicap) and thus can
less easily access the treatment benefits that the wealthy more

90

See Ben-Shahar and Logue, 68 Stan L Rev at 606–07 (cited in note 57).
Id at 613.
92 Florida Hurricane Insurance: Fact File (Insurance Information Institute, Oct
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/WVB9-XAUP.
93 Climate Change: Financial Risks to Federal and Private Insurers in Coming Decades
Are Potentially Significant *25 (GAO, Mar 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/ZA9N-MM5V.
91

1788

The University of Chicago Law Review

[83:1755

readily secure.94 Further, as health plans and medical bureaucracies become more complex, it is the sophisticates that can better
understand and utilize the labyrinth of insurance benefits (information handicap).95 Indeed, much regulatory effort has been focused on “health insurance literacy” and on simplifying the “Summary of Coverage” forms that enrollees receive, to afford greater
accessibility to the less educated. But the results are disappointing. People have difficulty ascertaining what is covered, what it
costs, and which plans to choose.96 As a result, rates of health care
utilization vary, and insurance benefits realization falls short of
plan treatment eligibility. If there are disproportionate rates of
utilization of benefits among people with different wealth and sophistication, health insurance can quickly become regressive in
the strong sense, as long as the disproportionate utilization outweighs the higher premiums that the high earners pay.
This regressive effect—a wealth transfer from those with less
means to the more affluent—has been documented, for example,
in the area of mental health insurance. One of the access justice
trends promoted by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act97 is to mandate mental health benefits as part of all health
plans.98 But studies found that, when mental health benefits are
covered, whites and high-income individuals consume more services than nonwhites and low-income individuals.99 Nonwhites
and low-income individuals do not take advantage of these benefits at the same rates as their white and more affluent coworkers,
and to the degree that nonwhites and low-income individuals seek
care for mental illnesses, they are more likely to turn to general

94 See Joseph Newhouse, et al, Free for All? Lessons from the RAND Health Insurance
Experiment 57–58 (Harvard 1993) (discussing whether cost sharing had a larger effect
among the poor).
95 See M. Gregg Bloche, Race and Discretion in American Medicine, 1 Yale J Health
Pol, L & Ethics 95, 108 (2001).
96 See Lynn Quincy, Making Health Insurance Cost-Sharing Clear to Consumers:
Challenges in Implementing Health Reform’s Insurance Disclosure Requirements *4–6
(Commonwealth Fund, Feb 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/G7TU-6P4J.
97 Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010), codified in various sections of Title 42.
98 See Health Benefits & Coverage: Mental Health & Substance Abuse Coverage (US
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services), archived at http://perma.cc/MA9E-MTSW.
99 See, for example, Barak D. Richman, Insurance Expansions: Do They Hurt Those
They Are Designed to Help?, 26 Health Aff 1345, 1351 (2007).
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practitioners rather than to mental health professionals. For example, it was found that whites take advantage of outpatient
mental health benefits about four times more often than blacks.100
If these findings can be generalized—if mental health insurance benefits are deployed by the elites more—these benefits constitute transfers from nonwhites to whites and from low-income
to high-income workers. The mandates provide access to mental
health care to all, and they are commonly supported by the rhetoric of access for the weaker, otherwise-undertreated, groups. But
because insurance premiums under group health plans can only
imperfectly separate the pool, and thus cannot reflect the utilization by heavy users, everyone pays for services that are disproportionately consumed by the elite.
Again, it is worth refreshing a point made earlier.101 It might
not be troubling or even surprising that some individual components in a large multifaceted scheme are favoring the affluent.
Surely, some other components can more than offset this effect by
redistributing in favor of other groups. It is the net effect of the
program overall that matters, not its individual benefits. The regressive impact of specific features is troubling only to the extent
that it is both unintended and not accounted for in the overall
calculus. If a feature of the insurance program is thought to be
progressive, and if political capital is spent in passing it to favor
the poor, it might then be more problematic to discover that its
effects run counter to establishment wisdom.
4. Mandated accommodations.
In general, laws mandating access for people with disabilities
have an important effect that goes beyond income redistribution.
Enabling disabled people to access public areas, buildings, and
transportation allows them fuller participation in society, and
serves the goal of “equal access to societal opportunities.”102 For
100 See id at 1349. In a further study, Professor Barak Richman and his coauthors
demonstrated that the greater use of mental health treatments among whites and highincome patients is not explained by greater incidence of mental illness. Strikingly, there
is no significant evidence that higher incidence of outpatient mental health care reduces
the likelihood of adverse mental health (measured by the probability of hospitalization for
mental illness). See Barak Richman, et al, Mental Health Care Consumption and Outcomes: Considering Preventative Strategies across Race and Class *8, archived at http://
perma.cc/ED36-F5NL.
101 See text accompanying note 25.
102 Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics
of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 Va L Rev 825, 860 (2003). See also Samuel R. Bagenstos,
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example, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973103 forbids organizations and employers from excluding individuals with disabilities or denying them an equal opportunity to receive program benefits and services. It is aimed to “guarantee [ ] equal opportunity”
and “equal access” for people with disabilities.104
But, in a subtle manner, disability accommodations could be
regressive within the eligible class, when they disproportionately
benefit the elite among those entitled to the accommodation. Consider the following example. Under the above-mentioned § 504,
public school students with disabilities are entitled to accommodations such as additional time on exams and assignments. There
is now growing evidence that in reality students from affluent areas
are far more likely to enjoy these accommodations than are students
from poor areas. A survey by the US Department of Education’s
Civil Rights Data Collection shows that students in wealthy districts have nearly five times more utilization of the accommodations, relative to the state average. In Illinois, only about 1 percent of public school students statewide had § 504
accommodations, compared to 5 percent in Chicago’s wealthy suburbs. The twenty districts with the highest percentages of accommodations had 76 percent white enrollments and all had lower
percentages of poverty than the state average, while the twenty
districts with the lowest accommodation rate were only 19 percent
white and had far higher poverty rates than the state average.105
Section 504 was designed to level the playing field for people
with disabilities, and in a broad range of areas does so effectively.
But some of its privileges are not simple or cheap to invoke, thus
setting off an unintended sorting dynamic, resulting in selective
access. First, the information handicap: some measure of sophistication is necessary to know about the available accommodations, how to apply for them, how to be tested, and who pays for

Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability”, 86 Va L Rev 397, 426–30 (2000); US Airways,
Inc v Barnett, 535 US 391, 397 (2002) (noting that “basic equal opportunity” was the goal
of the Americans with Disabilities Act).
103 Pub L No 93-112, 87 Stat 355, codified at 29 USC § 701 et seq.
104 29 USC § 701(b)(1)(F), (c)(2).
105 Diane Rado, Special Help Starts as Early as Grade School—but Only for Select
Students (Chicago Tribune, June 6, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/4BGQ-N4LP. For
the full data, see New Data from U.S. Department of Education Highlights Educational
Inequities around Teacher Experience, Discipline and High School Rigor (US Department
of Education, Mar 6, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/A7US-PSLC.
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the tests.106 Second, the cost handicap: exam accommodations require the qualifying student to be diagnosed as having a learning
disability.107 These diagnostics are expensive and require both financial investment and motivation. And so, like the remote vacation parks that are difficult to reach, equal access is an illusion.
Finally, there is the network handicap: pragmatically, families in
social networks that know about and discuss the practice of children’s exam preparations and accommodation diagnostics are
more likely to seek the accommodation.108
The same problem has been documented, for example, with
college admissions. Texas’s “Top 10 Percent Plan,” an access justice program that provides automatic admission to all state universities for students in the top 10 percent of their high school
classes, has been shown to benefit poor communities less than expected: “Where there isn’t a strong college-going culture . . . we
don’t find evidence that eligibility for the top 10 percent has an
impact on students going to the flagship [university].”109 With differential propensities to invoke the accommodation, the gap between the sophisticated and the poor reemerges, and the accommodations end up being deployed by high-income and elite
groups.
Neither exam accommodations nor selective enrollment to
colleges are transfers from the poor to the wealthy. Exam accommodations granted to disabled students in wealthy suburbs do not
come at the expense of disabled students in poor districts, because
all can qualify. Instead, the advantages of exam accommodations

106 See Office of Diverse Learner Supports and Services (Chicago Public Schools, Nov
18, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/HWJ2-WQ79 (discussing the process of applying for
accommodations); Special Education (Davis Joint Unified School District), online at
http://www.djusd.k12.ca.us/speced (visited Mar 20, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable)
(stating that anyone can request an evaluation in writing).
107 See Mark Kelman and Gillian Lester, Jumping the Queue: An Inquiry into the
Legal Treatment of Students with Learning Disabilities 47–48 (Harvard 1997) (discussing
the complex process of identifying a learning disorder).
108 See Jake Tapper, Dan Morris, and Lara Setrakian, Does Loophole Give Rich Kids
More Time on SAT? (ABC News, Mar 30, 2006), online at http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/
loophole-give-rich-kids-time-sat/story?id=1787712 (visited Mar 20, 2016) (Perma archive
unavailable) (describing how some wealthy students employ money and social connections
to get diagnoses that grant them extra time on standardized tests).
109 Laura Isensee, New Research Finds Top 10 Percent Plan Impacts Students Differently (Houston Public Media, Apr 22, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/PU94-J588. See
also Lindsay Daugherty, Paco Martorell, and Isaac McFarlin Jr, Percent Plans, Automatic
Admissions, and College Outcomes *27 (IZA Journal of Labor Economics, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/8EXB-93FV.

1792

The University of Chicago Law Review

[83:1755

come largely at the expense of nondisabled students (and disproportionately those from wealthy suburbs). Similarly, automatic
acceptance to colleges for the top 10 percent comes again at the
expense of those who would otherwise be admitted, mostly strong
students. But as long as the access policies serve affluent populations and not the poor, the relative opportunities of the affluent
increase. The difficulties attributed to learning disabilities or to
lack of elite college education then continue to be concentrated
more among the poor who do not deploy the opportunities for improvement, contributing to their relative deprivation.
5. Preservation of open space.
In recent decades, numerous states and local communities
enacted land preservation acts, authorizing special taxes and
budgetary allocations to purchase and convert private land for
public purposes. As access justice policies, their purpose is to protect “open space,” “affordable housing,” and historical preservation, and to counteract private forces of commercial development,
selective access, and excessive growth.110 “Equitable access to
open, green spaces is vital to the environmental, social, and economic life of a community. . . . [C]hildren are better able to learn
and people are happier and healthier when they have access to
natural settings.”111 The Trust for Public Land champions such
efforts as “protect[ing] land for people” and ensuring “easy access
to a safe place to play in nature.”112
For example, the Massachusetts Community Preservation
Act113 (CPA) was passed in 2000, allowing cities and towns to
adopt a CPA program by imposing property tax surcharges of up
to 3 percent, thus becoming eligible for matching funds from the
state, bankrolled by fees imposed on all deed registry transactions.114 Who benefits from this program? Who pays for it?
Not surprisingly, affluent towns are the biggest winners. It
was estimated that “communities in the highest quintile for property values received $127 per capita in CPA matching funds,
110 Christopher Hawkins, Electoral Support for Community Growth Management Policy, 92 Soc Sci Q 268, 282 (2011). For an example of one such act, see Community Preservation Act § 2, 2000 Mass Acts 1234, codified as amended at Mass Ann Laws ch 44B, § 2.
111 Veda Truesdale, Open Space Access: Passive Recreation, Pocket Parks, Greenways/
Blueways (New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Sept 2007), archived at
http://perma.cc/65TT-BE36.
112 Our Work (Trust for Public Land), archived at http://perma.cc/9V74-PWQV.
113 2000 Mass Act 1234, codified as amended at Mass Ann Laws ch 44B, § 1 et seq.
114 Mass Ann Laws ch 44B, §§ 3(b), 9.
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while . . . [those] in the lowest three quintiles received $10, $5,
and $3 per capita respectively.”115 “A large share of the state funds
is going to a few communities with high property values.”116 The
median income among the top ten winners—communities that received the largest state-funded subsidy—was about $87,000,
while the median income within the top losers—those who pay to
fund the subsidy but do not enjoy it—was only about $38,000.117
Even in the winning communities, the bulk of the state funding
is spent not on affordable housing (which would have been progressive), but on open space protection.118
Why do affluent municipalities receive the bulk of the benefit? In short: due to the affordability handicap. Adoption of the 3
percent property tax surcharge, which is required to qualify for
the state subsidy, is correlated with high property value.119 Lowincome communities are reluctant to vote for tax increases, and
stay out.
Even more disturbingly, while lower-income cities refrain
from tapping into the CPA subsidy spigot, they nevertheless pay
more than their share to fund its costs. Under the Massachusetts
law, the subsidy is paid for through lump sum fees imposed on all
real estate transactions, statewide.120 This means that larger cities, where most of the transactions occur, are the big contributors.
But larger cities are also concentrations of low-income residents
and low property values, where CPA referenda rarely pass. Thus,
“the residents of poor communities that could not afford a land
bank would end up subsidizing, through their state taxes,
wealthy communities that might have afforded a land bank on
their own.”121 When all is said and done, in the name of access
justice, resources are transferred from residents of the poorer cities to the wealthy communities. Weston, Newton, and Nantucket
win. Worcester loses.
Open space preservation policies are regressive in another indirect way. Reducing the supply of land for development increases

115 Robin Sherman and David Luberoff, The Massachusetts Community Preservation
Act: Who Benefits, Who Pays? *11 (Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston, July 2007),
archived at http://perma.cc/D6AH-7T5C.
116 Id at *13.
117 Id at *16.
118 Id at *17.
119 Sherman and Luberoff, The Massachusetts Community Preservation Act at *20
(cited in note 115).
120 See Mass Ann Laws ch 44B, §§ 8–9.
121 Community Preservation, Boston Globe A22 (Nov 3, 1999).
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housing prices, crowding out the poor.122 Labeled by one report as
“the new segregation,” restricted growth policies “deter AfricanAmerican and other minorities from the housing market [at] disproportionate rates.”123 The city of Portland, Oregon, with its aggressive land preservation and urban growth boundary rules and
rapidly climbing housing costs,124 is a testament to this causal
effect.125
II. ACCESS TO COURTS
Part I introduced a general, transsubstantive pattern. Access
justice works only in a superficial sense. When the rubber hits the
road and we start counting who utilizes (and how often) the publicly provided open access programs, differential access rates may
correlate with income and sophistication. Access justice policies
that are not specifically targeted to needy recipients but are instead “universal” or “neutral” or “open” can be a perk to sophisticated recipients who are comparatively competent at collecting
the benefits, particularly if they do not bear a commensurate
share of the cost.
I will now examine this paradox in the context of what is perhaps the most important and controversial access justice debate
of recent times: access to courts. This is a debate over a distinct
institutional issue: Should the law enforce mass-market arbitration agreements that require aggrieved individuals to file their
complaints in an arbitration forum chosen by the commercial
party with whom they dealt? These predispute agreements over
mandatory arbitration effectively bar the plaintiffs’ access to
courts of law and replace it with what many regard as inferior,
stingier arbitration justice, stripped of the threat of class action.

122 See Randall J. Pozdena, Smart Growth and Its Effects on Housing Markets: The
New Segregation *33 (National Center for Public Policy Research, Nov 2002), archived at
http://perma.cc/NC9A-UA6A (“[T]he burden of site-supply restrictions will fall disproportionately on poor and minority families.”).
123 Id at *v.
124 Portland is ranked among the top ten least affordable cities in America. See Erik
Gunther, Start Saving Now! These Are the 10 Least Affordable Cities in America (National
Association of Realtors, Jan 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/G9EC-CSFQ.
125 See Samuel R. Staley, Jefferson G. Edgens, and Gerard C.S. Mildner, A Line in
the Land: Urban-Growth Boundaries, Smart Growth, and Housing Affordability *23–24
(Reason Public Policy Institute Policy Study No 263), archived at http://perma.cc/KAK6
-DUGR; Joe Streckert, How We Got Here (Portland Mercury, Aug 5, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/L8G6-FUCM.
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A. The Debate over Mandatory Arbitration
Despite heroic efforts by various courts to strike them as unconscionable, mandatory arbitration clauses are enforceable.126
Commentators, however, are bluntly critical of this jurisprudence, which they argue limits people’s access to judicial forums,
and potentially to any kind of remedy. “[A]n arbitration clause
causes our right to jury trial to vanish.”127 “Large areas of American life and commerce have silently been insulated from the lawsuit culture.”128 Critics of arbitration clauses challenge the superficial notion that such contractual provisions represent the joint
interests of both businesses and consumers.129 These arrangements are not negotiated, and are often not even noticed at the
time of contracting. The fine print authorizing them is merely “paperwork,” not informed consent, and the choice whether to agree
to mandatory arbitration is not much of a choice when all vendors
who compete in some product space require an agreement to arbitrate.130 Of course, it is possible that waivers of access to courts
are rational. As Judge Frank Easterbrook has said, “People are
free to opt for bargain-basement adjudication” because “[i]n competition, prices adjust and both sides gain. ‘Nothing but the best’
may be the motto of a particular consumer but is not something
the legal system foists on all consumers.”131 Arbitration clauses are
like other features of the deal—they “[a]ll stand or fall together.”132

126 See AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion, 563 US 333, 337–38 (2011) (describing such
holdings by the California Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and a California district
court); American Express Co v Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S Ct 2304, 2312 (2013).
127 Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule
of Law 108 (Princeton 2013).
128 Patti Waldmeir, How America Is Privatising Justice by the Back Door, Fin Times
12 (June 30, 2003).
129 See, for example, Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the
Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 Wash U L Q 637, 642–43 (1996)
(“[I]t is critical to distinguish between commercial arbitration voluntarily agreed to by
parties of approximately equal bargaining power, and commercial arbitration forced upon
unknowing consumers, franchisees, employees or others through the use of form contracts.”).
130 Radin, Boilerplate at 7–9 (cited in note 127).
131 Carbajal v H & R Block Tax Services, Inc, 372 F3d 903, 906 (7th Cir 2004)
(Easterbrook).
132 Oblix, Inc v Winiecki, 374 F3d 488, 491 (7th Cir 2004) (Easterbrook).
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Nevertheless, the overwhelming conclusion among critics is
that arbitration has the “capacity to reduce, if not altogether eliminate, access to the courts and to the law.”133 This concern of limited access to law has two primary aspects, one relating to compensation and the other to deterrence.134 The compensatory
concern is based on the thought that litigation provides superior
recovery because it is cheaper to file and to pursue, granting more
effective procedural weapons (like discovery). It is also public and
thus has precedential value, and it allows for more substantial
remedies. The deterrence concern is based on the limited incentive of consumers to enforce small claims. One artifact of arbitration clauses is the class action waiver.135 Critics believe that “such
clauses should not be enforced at all because any gains from aggregate litigation in terms of better incentives to take care ex ante
would be lost.”136 As a result, consumers as a group are disfavored,
whereas the more powerful businesses benefit.137
133 Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L
Rev 819, 822 (2003).
134 See Heather Bromfield, Comment, The Denial of Relief: The Enforcement of Class
Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements, 43 UC Davis L Rev 315, 341–46 (2009); Richard
A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 Colum L Rev 1872, 1904–09 (2006). See also Jean R. Sternlight,
Tsunami: AT&T Mobile LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 Or L Rev 703,
704–05 (2012) (noting that after Concepcion the lack of an ability to arbitrate on behalf of
a class of plaintiffs was likely to reduce access to any sort of remedy for those who had
been harmed); Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consumers
from Presenting Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 Sw L Rev 87, 89 (2012) (stating that
Concepcion “has greatly reduced the likelihood that consumers can enforce certain of their
legal rights in any forum”); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997
Wis L Rev 33, 37 (noting that compelled arbitration takes the ability to access courts away
from plaintiffs).
135 See Christopher R. Drahozal and Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not
Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 Ohio St J Disp Res 433, 444 (2010) (finding that “all of the
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts [in the study] contained a class arbitration
waiver”). See also Kimberly L. Intagliata, Comment, Improving the Quality of Care in
Nursing Homes: Class Action Impact Litigation, 73 U Colo L Rev 1013, 1031–32 (2002)
(discussing how class actions give access to plaintiffs who would otherwise have claims
that were too small to bring, and therefore deter potential defendants from harming patients in nursing homes); David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation
Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 Va L Rev 1871, 1874 (2002) (stating that “[c]lass action is indispensible to achieving the social objective of minimizing the
sum of accident costs through tort deterrence”).
136 Gerhard Wagner, Dispute Resolution as a Product: Competition between Civil Justice Systems, in Horst Eidenmüller, ed, Regulatory Competition in Contract Law and Dispute Resolution 347, 394 (Verlag C.H. Beck 2013).
137 See Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process Is Due?, 39 Harv J
Legis 281, 284 (2002) (arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act has been used to make
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My goal is to explore the validity of the access-to-courts distributive concerns. It turns out, however, that the question
whether arbitration renders justice less accessible to consumers
as a group is difficult to untangle empirically (more on this later).
Thus, as a first step, I want to ask a subtler question: Assuming
that arbitration limits the incidence of lawsuits and the magnitude of recovery, who among consumers are affected more? What
are the characteristics of the consumers who, in the absence of
arbitration clauses, would have litigated their claims? Are there
consumers that perhaps lose nothing, or even benefit from the arbitration mandate? If consumers vary in their sophistication, education, psyche, wealth, vulnerability, type and size of injuries,
litigiousness, or other traits, does the denial of access to courts
hurt weaker consumers disproportionately more? Or does it hurt
the more sophisticated consumers? Rather than looking at consumers as a homogeneous group—as most of the literature explicitly or implicitly does—my goal is to unpack the rank of “consumers” and identify the adversely affected subgroups.
The concerns over access justice would be all the more powerful and urgent if the denial of litigation is disproportionately
affecting weak consumers. Indeed, this is a plausible conjecture:
those who have fewer resources and less sophistication are less
likely to be able to pay the upfront fees of filing for arbitration,
and thus will be denied any kind of redress.138 On the other hand,
the concerns over access to courts would be weakened if it turns
out that only elite groups of litigious consumers are adversely affected by the limited access to courts, and that—in an unappreciated way, by reducing firms’ costs of litigation and the prices of
products—weak consumers benefit.
There are two steps to the remaining argument. The first, in
Part II.B, applies the framework developed above and examines
the direction of the cross-subsidy. If equal access to courts is deployed differentially by people, who benefits and who loses? Is it
a regressive policy? The second step, developed in Part II.B, is to
examine the possibility of a different channel of access—“vicarious
access.” This is a unique feature of access to courts, not present in
arbitration “a tool for the powerful to exert authority over the less powerful”); Lee Goldman,
Contractually Expanded Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 Harv Negotiation L Rev 171,
193 (2003).
138 See Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67 L &
Contemp Probs 133, 135 (Winter/Spring 2004) (“For substantial claims, the services’ fees
alone likely make access to arbitration infeasible, and actual costs are often made even
greater by the terms of the arbitration agreement.”).
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other equal access policies, whereby the value of open access is
enjoyed not directly but through representatives. Access to courts
allows vicarious access through class actions. Because class actions
are a method to distribute the benefits of litigation to those who
otherwise fail to utilize it, is there still a regressive cross-subsidy?
B. The Litigation Cross-Subsidy
The working hypothesis in much of the commentary on litigation versus arbitration is that consumers would fare better in
litigation in securing remedies vis-à-vis their business rivals.139 I
will take this premise—that arbitration is effective in reducing
firms’ liability—as a starting point. Some empirical work has contested it, suggesting that consumers and employees actually fare
well in arbitration, relative to litigation. Indeed, labor unions often
negotiate for arbitration in collective agreements, and surely they
wouldn’t do so to reduce their potential recovery.140 But the empirical question remains open and widely controversial.141
My argument, instead, is that if arbitration indeed reduces
consumers’ access to redress, this effect is potentially favorable
not only to firms, but also to the weakest subgroups of consumers.
This is a direct application of the strong form of the regressive
cross-subsidy idea. Access to courts is an access justice policy that,
although available to all, is disproportionately utilized by the sophisticated elite, and these benefits are partially paid for by all
consumers, including the less sophisticated consumers, through
higher prices. Accordingly, if indeed arbitration restricts access to
139 See, for example, David Horton and Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 Georgetown L J 57, 99–116
(2015) (investigating empirically whether consumers are disadvantaged in arbitration and
concluding that “consumers facing high-level and super repeat-playing defendants are
strongly disadvantaged in the arbitral forum relative to consumers facing one-shot
defendants”).
140 See Peter Florey, Labor & Employment Arbitration: Questions for the Late ’90s, 52
Disp Res J 66, 70 (Spring 1997) (quoting multiple scholars giving unions credit for the
success of arbitration in the context of collective bargaining); Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the
1990s, 74 Denver U L Rev 1017, 1020 (1996) (stating that it is usually assumed that collective bargaining agreements will contain arbitration clauses); Kenneth M. Casebeer, Supreme
Court without a Clue: 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett and the System of Collective Action and
Collective Bargaining Established by the National Labor Relations Act, 65 U Miami L Rev
1063, 1072 (2011) (stating that labor arbitration is often viewed by parties “as an extension
of the collective-bargaining process” and is therefore favored) (emphasis omitted).
141 This question was the topic of a symposium at the University of Michigan entitled
Empirical Studies of Mandatory Arbitration. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar, How Bad
Are Mandatory Arbitration Terms?, 41 U Mich J L Ref 777 (2008).
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lawsuits and to recovery, it removes the regressive cross-subsidy.
A nonsuing consumer who wants to pay low prices should thus
root for a contract that maximally restricts access to courts.
1. Who benefits from access to courts?
When access to courts and to litigation is free and unrestricted, who takes advantage of it? In order to pursue any kind
of litigation strategy, the aggrieved claimant has to understand
that her rights were violated (and that a court can be similarly
persuaded). She must also have enough of a litigious nature to
undertake the ordeal of an adversary proceeding. She then has to
find an attorney that will take the case. And, importantly, the
claimant has to have the patience to await a remedy that sometimes takes years to secure. True, a settlement might be reached
early, but without a credible threat to litigate the case all the way
to judgment, the settlement amount would not reflect the merits.
These are characteristics that are more likely to be found in
wealthier, more educated, and more sophisticated consumers.142
Take the first link in this chain—the ability to recognize that a
violation occurred. The consumer has to know her rights, meaning she has to be educated enough to read, understand, and exploit the information written (sometimes in legal language) in the
consumer contract, the employment handbook, or other lengthy
disclosures. For example, if the consumer was hit with a large
unexpected fee, or received an inferior product, or discovered that
her personal information is being harvested from her account, the
consumer needs to verify that the fee, the product, or the data
collection was a violation of the fine print terms to which the consumer agreed sometime in the past (or during one of the numerous updates since). Few, even among the very literate, know how
to find these documents, and fewer still know what they really say.
But while the agony of reading fine print is a shared experience among all, it is well documented that poor, less educated consumers are less likely to successfully read and understand the
terms of contracts, which are complex legal texts. To recognize a
violation and articulate a complaint, consumers have to be competent in performing nontrivial numeracy skills, including some

142

See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L & Society Rev 95 (1974).
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understanding of risk and probabilities—which they often lack.143
One study suggests that only 3 to 4 percent of the population can
understand the language in which contracts are drafted.144 And it
is no secret that low levels of literacy are concentrated among lowincome people and minorities.145 Maybe things can be improved
by financial literacy campaigns and “heightened” disclosures, but
as we saw already,146 mandated disclosures are the gods sending
nuts to those who have no teeth. Disclosure operates to exacerbate the regressivity. The more disclosure-trained and cautious
are the recipients of financial literacy training (who are disproportionately the well-educated), the greater their relative advantage.147
But weak consumers are less likely to seek remedies in court
for reasons beyond their poor ability to read boilerplate and understand their rights. The poor and the disadvantaged endure
more abuse and exploitation by dealing with lower-quality vendors. For them, legal problems are not discrete extraordinary
events but rather the course of everyday life.148 As a result, their
expectations for decent treatment—and for remedies in the event
that it is not rendered—may be comparatively depressed, and
their propensity to turn to the court for resolution may be lower.149
Further, when they are defrauded, the magnitudes of their
claims are smaller. True, some violations of rights lead to fixed,

143 See Annamaria Lusardi and Olivia S. Mitchell, Financial Literacy: Evidence and
Implications for Financial Education *2 (TIAA-CREF Institute, May 2009), archived at
http://perma.cc/7S65-K4CU.
144 See Alan M. White and Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 Stan L
& Pol Rev 233, 237, 239 (2002) (“The degree of literacy required to comprehend the average
disclosure form and key contract terms simply is not within the reach of the majority of
American adults.”).
145 See Mark Kutner, et al, Literacy in Everyday Life: Results from the 2003 National
Assessment of Adult Literacy *15, 31 (National Center for Education Statistics, Apr 2007),
archived at http://perma.cc/2YVG-UUV7.
146 See Part I.D.1.
147 See, for example, Daniel Fernandes, John G. Lynch Jr, and Richard G. Netemeyer,
Financial Literacy, Financial Education, and Downstream Financial Behaviors, 60 Mgmt
Sci 1861, 1874 (2014) (finding “that financial literacy has less effect in low-income samples”).
148 See Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 Yale L J 1049, 1050 (1970)
(“Poor people do not lead settled lives into which the law seldom intrudes; they are constantly involved with the law in its most intrusive forms.”).
149 For example, low-income parents are more “fatalistic” about children’s exposure to
hazards and less influenced by safety warnings, even though their children are disproportionately exposed to these hazards. David Klein, Societal Influences on Childhood Accidents, 12 Accident Analysis & Prevention 275, 275 (1980). See also Marcel E. Conrad, Patricia
Brown, and Marcia G. Conrad, Fatalism and Breast Cancer in Black Women, 125 Annals
Internal Med 941, 942 (1996) (finding that even when breast cancer screening was provided at no cost, few minority patients availed themselves of the resources).
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lump sum recovery (for example, statutory damages), or to recovery that is in theory independent of wealth (for example, medical
expenses). But many violations lead to losses that do depend on
income.150 Wealthier people buy more products and pay higher
prices, which account for larger nominal losses when fraud or violation occurs. And wealthier people may suffer larger losses
when recovery is measured by earning capacity, lost income, lost
property value, lost opportunity, or other consequential harms.
If the poor have lower nominal claims, they also become less
attractive clients for attorneys. As it is, there is evidence that only
a small fraction of individuals with claims who seek private representation are able to obtain counsel.151 The great majority of
low-income claimants cannot afford legal counsel and cannot find
their way into the court system.152 Small claims leave less recovery once litigation costs are netted, and there is plenty of evidence
that litigation indeed takes longer than arbitration153 (and, although
the possibility of settlements blurs the empirical comparison, settlements in the shadow of costly litigation are likely to be stingier). And among people who go to court and self-represent, the
poor and less educated are also less effective in advocating their
claims.154 There is convincing evidence that litigation is a costeffective dispute resolution strategy only for high-stakes claims.
Most poor consumers don’t have such claims.
Moreover, courts operate slowly and court-awarded remedies
take time to secure. The higher the consumer-plaintiff’s discount
rate and the more liquidity-constrained she is, the less valuable
the delayed recovery is (even if it is compounded by interest), and
150 See Mark C. Weidemaier, From Court-Surrogate to Regulatory Tool: Re-framing
the Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration, 41 U Mich J L Ref 843, 855 (2008) (noting
that “employee salary is likely to correlate positively with award size”).
151 See Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights,
30 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 29, 58 (1998) (“The result of these formidable hurdles is that
most people with claims against their employer are unable to obtain counsel, and thus
never receive justice.”); William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination: What Really Does Happen? What Really Should Happen?, 50 Disp Res J 40, 45
(Oct–Dec 1995). For more data on low- and moderate-income households’ access to attorneys, see generally Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyers’ Pro Bono Services and American-Style
Civil Legal Assistance, 41 L & Society Rev 79 (2007) (finding that indigent clients have
become increasingly dependent on pro bono programs).
152 See Nourit Zimmerman and Tom R. Tyler, Between Access to Counsel and Access
to Justice: A Psychological Perspective, 37 Fordham Urban L J 473, 478 (2009).
153 See Weidemaier, 41 U Mich J L Ref at 846 (cited in note 150).
154 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 41 U Mich J L Ref 813, 831 (2008) (noting that, for resolving small claims,
arbitration may be the cheapest option).
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the more amenable the consumer is to accepting a small settlement rather than “vindicating” her legal rights through a fullblown judgment.155
Finally, litigation is risky business. The greater the uncertainty about the outcome of litigation, the less beneficial it is for
risk-averse plaintiffs, who would prefer lower settlements to the
uncertainty of litigating the case fully.156 It is widely accepted that
poorer individuals exhibit higher degrees of risk aversion,157 and
thus value the prospect of the litigation “damages lottery” less.
All these findings suggest that the litigation right would be
more valuable, and more commonly realized, with better returns
and larger settlements, by stronger consumers—those who know
their rights and can effectively pursue them against a sophisticated business opponent or its experienced insurer. There are
some data to support this, although they are mostly anecdotal and
not systematic. Some evidence comes from the area of employee
claims—in which, even when litigation is permitted, there are almost no cases of recovery by low-paid wageworkers. Professors
Theodore Eisenberg and Elizabeth Hill concluded that “the absence of cases of this type is likely explained by the fact that
lower-paid employees seem to lack ready access to court, as other
researchers have reported.”158 Hill showed that, unlike arbitration, litigation is unrealistic for employees with incomes below
$60,000.159 And Professor Ted St. Antoine posits that defendants
“wait out most smaller claims, assuming employees will not be
able to pursue them in court.”160

155 See Emily C. Lawrance, Poverty and the Rate of Time Preference: Evidence from
Panel Data, 99 J Polit Econ 54, 72 (1991) (finding that “[p]oor households are likely to
possess relatively high rates of time preference”).
156 See Uri Weiss, The Regressive Effect of Legal Uncertainty *2–3 (Tel Aviv University
Law Faculty Paper 30, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/X9PX-HS3L.
157 See Nancy Ammon Jianakoplos and Alexandra Bernasek, Are Women More Risk
Averse?, 36 Econ Inquiry 620, 629 (1998) (confirming findings that “relative risk aversion
decreases as household wealth increases”).
158 Theodore Eisenberg and Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment
Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 Disp Res J 44, 45 (Nov 2003–Jan 2004). See also
Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration
under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 Ohio St J Disp Res 777,
782 (2003) (“Studies to date indicate that only highly-compensated employees are able to
gain access to the court systems for their employment-related claims.”).
159 See Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, 58
Disp Res J 8, 10–11 (May–July 2003).
160 See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It’s Better Than It Looks,
41 U Mich J L Ref 783, 790 (2008).
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Additional hints that courts are accessed disproportionately
by the elite come from litigation of health benefits. Some legal
systems recognize a constitutional claim for a “right to health,”
which allows individuals to seek court protection of their right to
various medical treatments. A study in Brazil (where a right to
health is recognized) showed that the litigation that ensued under
this access-to-medicine paradigm was largely to the benefit of
elites, as it was used to secure high-tech and experimental treatments.161 The vast majority of the cases litigated were brought by
a privileged minority seeking access to “high-cost medicines, such
as new types of insulin for diabetes and new cancer drugs,” that
were otherwise excluded by health administrators because of low
effectiveness.162 It was shown that the right-to-health litigation
was largely concentrated in the richest regions, where a small minority “is able to use the court system to its advantage.”163 Access
to courts is otherwise “beyond the means and reach of most poor
Brazilians.”164 Further, the cost of these augmented treatments is
borne by others. As state resources devoted to health and provision of medications are fixed, such litigation reallocates general
health expenditures, which would otherwise benefit broader populations, in favor of the litigating minority.
Finally, more evidence about disproportionate utilization of
access to courts comes from India’s experience with “Public Interest
Litigation.” This is a judicial procedure “for enhancing the social
and economic rights of disadvantaged and marginalized groups in
India.”165 But a World Bank study found that what began as “an
effort on the part of the courts to speak to [ ] poverty, social exclusion, and powerlessness” has increasingly grown to be a forum for
middle-class lifestyle grievances.166 The report found some evidence that “judicial attitudes are less favorably inclined to the
claims of the poor than they used to be” and that the win rate for
marginalized groups is lower, and increasingly so, relative to that
of advantaged individuals.167 As the examples provided above

161 Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, Harming the Poor through Social Rights Litigation:
Lessons from Brazil, 89 Tex L Rev 1643, 1660–62 (2011).
162 Id at 1661.
163 Id at 1662.
164 Id.
165 Varun Gauri, Public Interest Litigation in India: Overreaching or Underachieving?
*i (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5109, Nov 2009), archived at http://
perma.cc/9GG3-LKST.
166 Id at *8.
167 Id at *13.
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show, it is unsurprising that peasants do not do as well as lawyers
and teachers in court.
2. Who pays for access to courts?
As shown above, litigation is regressive in the weak sense, as
sophisticated and higher-income people disproportionately enjoy
its benefits. This Section shows that it is also regressive in the
strong sense by answering the following questions: Do weaker
consumers who do not enjoy its benefits nevertheless pay for its
cost? Is the added recovery that litigation affords the high-income
group of consumers financed, at least in part, by the poor and unsophisticated consumers?
Here, I can point only to indirect effects. First, let us return
to the assumption mentioned at the outset of this Section—that
arbitration is cheaper for firms than litigation is (an assumption
regularly made by many commentators, in suggesting that vendors draft arbitration terms to reduce their legal exposure and
save money). The most compelling reason for this assumption is
the cost of liability. Arbitration that effectively inhibits lawsuits
reduces the liability exposures of firms, and likely also the cost of
liability insurance.168 Like any other cost, it affects the price of the
service. In highly competitive industries, most if not all of this
cost would be rolled into higher prices to consumers, whereas in
concentrated industries, only part of this cost would be borne by
consumers, and the rest by the vendors, depending on the elasticity of demand.169
One might object to this pass-through argument. A firm cannot pass along its litigation costs in the form of higher prices without losing its market share. The cost of litigation and liability, so
goes the argument, would either lower firms’ profits (without
pass-through to consumers) or induce firms to avoid malfeasance
in the first place. Either way, there would be no added cost borne
by the nonsuing customers.170 The latter argument (deterrence)
will be discussed in the next Section. For now, it suffices to recognize that even firms that offer excellent products and enjoy
growth of their market share face an endless trickle of potential
suits. It would be naïve to think that the litigation risk—and the
168 See Maltby, 30 Colum Hum Rts L Rev at 31–32 (cited in note 151) (finding that
mandatory arbitration clauses were used to reduce potential litigation costs).
169 Craswell, 43 Stan L Rev at 367–68 (cited in note 2).
170 See Adam Levitin, The Access-to-Justice Myth (Credit Slips, Aug 1, 2013), archived
at http://perma.cc/8JEP-7H6Q.
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cost of resolving it—could be fully petered out by “good behavior.”
In competitive industries, it is also less likely that firms would
absorb the added cost of litigation without any pass-through. And
if other firms in the industry face a similar magnitude of litigation
risk, the effect on market share would be a wash: all firms would
exhibit some increase in prices.
Thus, as long as some price effect exists, it tends to be shared
equally by all consumers. Unless vendors find ways to unbundle
the legal terms and sell incremental litigation rights for add-on
prices, people pay for features regardless of their propensity to
utilize them. A nondisclaimable right to litigate is merely a type
of mandatory quality improvement, and like any other such feature, it effectuates a cross-subsidy in favor of the group that enjoys it more. This is true whether the quality feature is part of the
product (like the size of a hard disk) or part of the contract. Mandatory warranties, rights to withdraw, or remedies make products more expensive and might well reflect the preferences of
some consumers. But for lower-income consumers, these protections are harder to invoke and to afford. If your budget permits
only the discounted items on the menu, a mandate to serve only
the high-end, high-price offering is bad news.
And so, if consumers have to pay for access to courts, many of
them would prefer low prices over free access. As Professor James
White bluntly put it, “For a nickel or a dime, almost all of us would
. . . agree to arbitrate.”171 Especially those for whom “a nickel or a
dime” matters.
3. Corrective versus distributive justice.
I have argued that access to courts fits the template of regressive access justice because elites are more likely to utilize it, incidentally imposing the costs of their utilization (through higher
product prices) on others. In this light, mandatory arbitration
clauses that deny access to courts eliminate a privilege that
weaker consumers rarely enjoy anyway and save them the cost of
cross-subsidizing their more affluent fellow consumers.
This Section continues the discussion by probing such questions as: Could the regressivity argument truly have such farreaching implications? Must the private right to seek redress for
wrongs—a fundamental building block of private law and private

171

James J. White, Contracting under Amended 2-207, 2004 Wis L Rev 723, 742.
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ordering—come with such troubling redistributive effects? Is corrective justice in private law inimical to distributive justice?
Upon some reflection, the gist of this claim, that equal and
open access to courts is regressive, may not be so surprising. It is
well recognized that reparatory commands of corrective justice,
even if applied universally, may not serve the goals of distributive
justice. Rights to sue and seek redress are corrective treatments
in the same way that drugs and health care are, working to remedy harms and ills. Notwithstanding its corrective effects, health
care is notoriously vulnerable to unfair allocation.172
For one, litigation remedies seek to reinstate a preinjury
state of affairs that was itself distributively unfair.173 Some are
returned to their preinjury high state, and others to their low
state. In addition, it would be a striking coincidence if the resources allocated to correct past wrongs were distributed in an
egalitarian fashion. Even priorities in criminal law and law enforcement, which are determined centrally and democratically,
allocate corrective and protective measures without much concern for any distributive criteria.174 This is all the more true in
private law, which lacks a central headquarters and affords its
corrective mechanism to anyone sophisticated enough to demand
it. In general, the distribution of corrective measures may conflict
with notions of distributive fairness, even if each measure itself
is working perfectly well as a corrective device.175
If private law remedies were cheap to secure, the access problem and its resulting redistributive imbalance would be trivially
solved. But the ideal of access to courts is implemented through a

172 See M. Makinen, et al, Inequalities in Health Care Use and Expenditures: Empirical Data from Eight Developing Countries and Countries in Transition, 78 Bull World
Health Org 55, 56 (2000) (analyzing the unequal distribution of health care in a variety of
countries and finding, for example, that, in Indonesia in 1990 only 12 percent of health
care funding went to the poorest 20 percent of households whereas 29 percent went to the
wealthiest 20 percent).
173 See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law 80 (Harvard 1995) (“[C]orrective
justice operates on entitlements without addressing the justice of the underlying distribution.”).
174 See generally Alon Harel and Gideon Parchomovsky, On Hate and Equality, 109
Yale L J 507, 538–39 (1999).
175 See John Gardner, What Is Tort Law for? Part 2. The Place of Distributive Justice
*7 (Oxford Legal Research Paper No 62/2013, May 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/G9E4-HPXQ. See also generally Tsachi Keren-Paz, Torts, Egalitarianism
and Distributive Justice (Ashgate 2007); Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective
Justice in the Tort Law of Accidents, 74 S Cal L Rev 193 (2000).
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cumbersome and expensive legal process. That such a process effectively denies practical access to the weaker sectors of the population is a feature already discussed.
There are cases in which the luxury of selective access to
courts imposes no cost on the poor. The affluent might be enjoying—and paying for—their exclusive access justice. There are
markets for goods and services that are already segregated, serving either the affluent or the poor but not both sectors, with no
intersector cross-subsidy. When five-star cruise ships, cosmetic
surgeons, or golf resorts are sued by aggrieved patrons, patients,
or players, any effect such suits might have on the prices of these
services does not matter to the poor. It might be weakly objectionable that the institution of public courts is serving only the affluent—that justice is a luxury good. But there is no redistribution
away from the poor.
Thus, the conflict with distributive fairness is more acute
when the access to courts enjoyed by the elites comes at a real cost
to the poor, through higher prices or limited choice. There are
many markets for goods and services—for example, telecommunications—that integrate a large cross-section of the population,
the poor and the affluent, who pay similar prices for similar products. In these markets, the cross-subsidy is a real concern.
Finally, the tradeoff between corrective and distributive fairness that I highlighted is a descriptive observation. It is an unintended consequence of selective access to courts. Nothing in the
analysis here responds to the question how to balance the two
justice concerns—correct private wrongs and redistribute fairly.
The analysis merely informs such discussion. It debunks the
myth that access to courts and to private law remedies is a slamdunk victory for justice concerns. Rather, consumers are not a
monolithic battalion equally eager to conquer the lawsuit battlefield. Victory for the alert few comes at a cost to the sluggish
many.
4. “Vicarious access”: The class action externality.
I now want to consider an important objection to the claim
that litigation is regressive. A crucial feature of existing arbitration clauses is the removal of class representation procedures. Arbitration clauses not only turn plaintiffs away from litigation,
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they also bar aggregation of suits.176 And class actions—even if
filed solely by the alert and the sophisticated—provide a positive
externality, which benefits all. Class action litigation produces
this positive externality in two ways. First, class actions enable
poorer class members to piggyback on the litigation efforts of others and collect the same recovery without any deliberate effort.
Second, if the threat of class actions changes the behavior of potential defendants, this deterrent effect is a public good enjoyed
by all consumers equally. As long as defendants are forced to pay
for their wrongdoing, it doesn’t matter who sues and collects—the
entire class, the class representative alone, or the class’s attorneys. The significant awards resulting from class actions serve
the interests of potential (nonsuing) victims.
This is an important qualification that, if true, diminishes the
regressive concern developed above. It would make access to
courts a sui generis species of access justice policy, one that provides neither direct benefit to the poor nor a disproportionate benefit to the wealthy. Rather, it is a mechanism that builds on vicarious access—access by representatives—relying on the
competence of these representatives to secure an equal benefit to all.
As in any representative model, the main concern is the
alignment of interests between the principals and the agentrepresentative. To determine if the representative model reduces
the regressivity concerns associated with free and open access to
courts, the following Section asks: Do active litigants promote the
compensatory and deterrence concerns that matter to nonlitigants? The discussion below examines the two potential classwide benefits of class actions—recovery to all and common deterrence. In a nutshell, the class-wide recovery effect is a phantom.
Even successful class actions have very low recovery rates. The
deterrence effect, however, is potentially more meaningful and
could be a game changer, but only if the version of deterrence it
produces is equally beneficial to all consumers. There are fundamental reasons to worry that it is not.
a) Recovery to all? Consider, first, the proposition that
low-income consumers benefit from class-wide recovery: at no cost
to them, the poor recover at least part of their loss. There is plenty
of sobering evidence showing that only a tiny, negligible fraction

176 See Concepcion, 563 US at 351 (holding that a state-law prohibition on class action
waivers conflicts with the Federal Arbitration Act’s objectives). See also Italian Colors,
133 S Ct at 2312.
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of class members actually redeem their share of the class recovery.177 For example, many class actions end with the attorneys
representing the class being paid in cash, but the consumermembers receiving coupons (although this practice is being cut
back by law).178 The average redemption rate of various coupons
has been measured to be somewhere between 1 percent and 6 percent, mirroring the typical corporate-issued promotional coupon
redemption rate.179 When Ford, for example, agreed to a settlement in a class action over the Explorer SUV rollover problem, it
was estimated to have a potential cost of up to $500 million. But
in the end, far less than 1 percent of the eligible consumers (seventyfive, out of a class of over one million) signed up to redeem their
price-cut coupons.180 In another consumer class action alleging deceptive business practices, members were entitled to total potential compensation of $64 million, but redemption was less than
$1.8 million.181

177 See Do Class Actions Benefit Class Members at *2 (cited in note 50) (stating that
settlements delivered funds to between 0.000006 percent and 12 percent of class members); Redman v RadioShack Corp, 768 F3d 622, 628 (7th Cir 2014) (noting that “a little
more than one half of one percent of the entire class . . . submitted claims for the coupon
in response”); Christopher S. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems
and Class Action Settlements, 59 Fla L Rev 71, 119–20 (2007) (stating that it is not uncommon for a small percentage of class members to file claims); William Simon, Class
Actions—Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 FRD 375, 379 (1973) (“Even after a settlement, where class members are notified that they can share in the recovery merely by
filing a simple proof of claim, only 10% to 15% bother to do so.”); Petruzzi’s, Inc v Darling–
Delaware Co, 983 F Supp 595, 605 (MD Pa 1996) (stating that when class members must
file proof of their claim “response rates are often very small, and rarely exceed 50%”).
178 See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub L No 109-2, 119 Stat 4, codified
in various sections of Title 28; Tanoh v Dow Chemical Co, 561 F3d 945, 952 (9th Cir 2009)
(discussing the ways in which CAFA was intended to ensure fair recoveries for class members).
179 See James Tharin and Brian Blockovich, Coupons and the Class Action Fairness
Act, 18 Georgetown J Legal Ethics 1443, 1445 (2005); Thomas A. Dickerson and Brenda
V. Mechmann, Consumer Class Actions and Coupon Settlements: Are Consumers Being
Shortchanged?, 12 Advancing Consumer Interest 6, 7 (Fall/Winter 2000) (finding redemption rates of between 2 and 6 percent).
180 Jef Feeley and Myron Levin, Ford Accord Garners Less Than 1 Percent Participation, Bloomberg News (July 7, 2009).
181 Strong v Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc, 173 FRD 167, 172 (WD La 1997). See
also Roundtable Discussion on Private Remedies: Class Action/Collective Action; Interface
between Private and Public Enforcement *4 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Competition Committee
Working Party No 3 on Co-operation and Enforcement, May 31, 2006), archived at
http://perma.cc/Z4LZ-DE5K. In another case, the proposed class settlement was not approved by the court, citing actual redemption rates that ranged from 0.002 percent to 0.11
percent for similar coupons. See Buchet v ITT Consumer Financial Corp, 858 F Supp 944,
944–95 (D Minn 1994).
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There are, to be sure, ways to increase participation rates by
providing cash payments rather than coupons, autoenrollment
with sticky opt-outs, and other tweaks. But in many cases any
meaningful consumer recovery would require some active steps
by the class members, triggering again the disproportionately low
participation rate by those who do not read the boilerplate notices
about the settlements. In fact, it is possible that various methods
to make recovery more accessible would bump against the information handicap or network handicap, and thus would exacerbate the disproportionate exclusion of the poor.
Furthermore, because many of the compensation schedules
are set in settlement negotiations by the plaintiff’s attorneys and
the defendants—both of whom have little interest in maximizing
the payouts to the anonymous class members who are underrepresented in these settlement negotiations—the mechanism is
inherently likely to shortchange the poorest among the class
members. In fact, there is reason to expect that settlements involving less-educated class members would tend to be especially
abusive and self-dealing because class members in such settlements rarely object to the settlement.182
It is possible that the value of class litigation would accrue to
all if the remedy granted is a forward-looking injunction or corrective advertising. Attorneys will still get their lodestar fees for
their success, and firms will happily comply by tweaking the language of the product label or other negotiated disclosures. It is
questionable, however, how much benefit, if any, these settlements generate for the public. In the absence of compensation,
the main remaining benefit is prevention though deterrence, to
which I now turn.
b) Deterrence. What about the deterrence effect? Do class
members—rich and poor alike—enjoy the compliance incentives
that the threat of class action litigation creates?
A deterrence effect would arise if class actions led to substantial judgments and settlements that were paid out. Disgorgement
of ill-gotten gains would be a powerful deterrent of misconduct.
The deterrence effect would diminish if these judgments and settlements were only partially cashed out by consumers. The above
Section demonstrated that redemption rates are low, but businesses do worry about the cost of settling class action litigation,

182

See Leslie, 59 Fla L Rev at 109–10 (cited in note 177) (discussing the futility of
class members’ objections to proposed settlements).
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or else they would not draft class action waivers. And so, it is
plausible that costly litigation is generated even with feeble redemption rates, forcing businesses to account for this cost in planning their primary conduct and to take extra care, thus delivering
better goods and services to all.
Ideally, class actions would target the firms that commit the
worst offenses and deliver the worst bargains. They would target
producers who deceive consumers (for example, by falsely labeling
products and charging higher prices); or manufacturers of defective and injurious products; or businesses that fraudulently bill
consumers for more than the businesses are entitled. But since
class actions are often driven by the financial incentives of the
attorneys launching them, they are selected according to a different criterion: the ability and willingness of the defendant to settle.
If the set of firms that are willing to settle is different from the
set of those that commit the worst offenses, class actions may
“underdeter, overdeter or deter the wrong parties.”183
Is there such divergence between the worst offenders and the
most-likely-to-settle defendants? Class actions are likely to target
the firms that have deep pockets and strong reputations to defend. Reputation and wealth are usually signs of success—badges
that only firms that developed desirable brands can wear. If a feature of the product malfunctions, or if the firm promoted a feature
that caused disappointment to consumers, the firm with the
strong brand reputation and large cash reserves would have more
incentive and capacity to redress the problem to avoid the negative reviews, the reputation penalty, and the resulting drop in
sales—all arising without litigation.184 If instead such firms stonewall and refuse to redress a complaint, it may likely be the type
of complaint that invokes a technical or frivolous violation, one
that does not hurt the firm’s market share.
To be sure, there are many meritorious claims against shady
businesses specializing, for example, in the gray areas of subprime lending (for example, usury cap violators, credit-repair organizations, and questionable debt collection practices),185 and
183

Thomas B. Leary, The FTC and Class Actions: Remarks before the Class Action
Litigation Summit (FTC, June 26, 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/S9HX-JEJZ.
184 See generally Omri Ben-Shahar, One-Way Contracts: Consumer Protection without
Law, 6 Eur Rev Contract L 221 (2010) (emphasizing that, absent legal protections, consumers would be even more reliant on brand reputation and would develop more sophisticated methods of measuring brand performance).
185 See Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime “HEL” Was Paved with Good
Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity Market, 51

1812

The University of Chicago Law Review

[83:1755

pursuing them through class actions would be particularly advantageous to the poor, who are disproportionately victimized by such
defendants. Class actions in these areas could at times provide an
important supplement to public enforcement. Indeed, many
consumer-credit protection statutes specifically envision class actions as an effective way of deterring patterns of creditor misbehavior, and the right to recover statutory damages makes the
award of damages in class action litigation easy to administer.186
Arbitration clauses effectively shut down this avenue of enforcement in areas that might directly benefit from increased deterrence. Viewed in this light, the Supreme Court’s approval of arbitration clauses in credit-repair organizations’ contracts, which
are mostly sold to the poor by nonreputable firms, is more harmful than the Court’s similar approval of a cellphone contract’s arbitration clause. The irony is that the Court’s liberal bloc seemed
more energized in opposing arbitration clauses in the latter case
(four dissenting justices) than in the former (only one dissent). 187
Still, it is questionable whether businesses that specialize in
deliberate advantage taking of less educated and poorer borrowers, like credit-repair organizations,188 would be effectively deterred by the threat of private attorney general suits. In such
cases, a coordinated agency-based enforcement campaign might
be superior as a regulatory technique. The worst wrongdoers may
not be the ones with the deepest pockets that attract private actions.

SC L Rev 473, 556 (2000) (discussing abusive terms and practices associated with subprime loans, including balloon payments and prepayment penalties); Leah A. Plunkett
and Ana Lucia Hurtado, Small-Dollar Loans, Big Problems: How States Protect Consumers from Abuses and How the Federal Government Can Help, 44 Suffolk U L Rev 31, 36
(2011) (discussing the criminal punishments for violating the usury cap).
186 See, for example, Credit Repair Organizations Act § 409, Pub L No 104-208, 110
Stat 3009-455, 3009-459 (1996), codified at 15 USC § 1679g (providing for statutory damages and attorney’s fees if a credit-repair organization harms a consumer); Consumer
Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996 § 2412, Pub L No 104-208, 110 Stat 3009-426, 3009-446,
codified as amended at 15 USC § 1681n (establishing damages for willing or knowing noncompliance); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act § 813, Pub L No 95-109, 91 Stat 874, 881
(1977), codified at 15 USC § 1692k (establishing civil liability for debt collectors who fail
to comply with the provisions of this statute); Truth in Lending Act § 130, 82 Stat at 157
(1968), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1640 (establishing civil liability and the ability
to bring suit as a class for violations of the act).
187 Compare Concepcion, 563 US at 357–67 (Breyer dissenting, joined by Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan), with CompuCredit Corp v Greenwood, 132 S Ct 665, 676–80
(2012) (Ginsburg dissenting).
188 See Credit Repair Scams (FTC, Aug 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/R3FG
-FVAH; Emily Patterson, Don’t Fall for Credit Repair Scams (Better Business Bureau,
June 8, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/FLS4-UPYW.
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And an effective enforcement campaign might require investigative resources aimed against a network of disperse fly-by-night defendants,189 with forward-looking as well as criminal remedies, rather than anecdotal suits that end up with meek settlements, that
compensate the lawyers more effectively than the victims, and
that do little to shut down the systematic abuse.
It is also important to imagine different ways in which firms
would be affected by class actions. In general, increased liability
could have several effects. First, it could lead firms to shut down
an entire activity as unprofitable, and, as a result, some consumers would be hurt. Some forms of high-risk, high-cost lending not
prohibited by statute, or FDA-approved drugs with harmful side
effects, have both substantial benefits and substantial costs.
Shutting down their distribution because of high liability costs,
instead of through fundamental regulatory cost-benefit analysis,
may hurt consumers.
Second, increased liability could lead firms to continue the activity but make sure they comply with the technical legal standards.
Manufacturers of products would have an incentive to reduce liability risks, but many of the precautions that accomplish this goal
would be ones designed by lawyers, not product engineers. It
might not be necessary to reduce the actual hazard of the product
if liability could be curbed by drafting longer warning labels or
disseminating new disclosures—avoiding claims of negligent failure to warn or deception. For example, if AT&T Mobility wants to
advertise “free phones” yet charges sales tax on the hypothetical
retail value, its fear that the ads might lead to liability for deceptive false advertising could have the sole effect of longer fine print
disclaimers. The AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion190 case—in
which a class action plaintiff alleged fraud on behalf of all customers who received free phones but were charged sales tax—
ended up with the landmark Supreme Court decision to validate
the arbitration clause and to effectively diminish consumers’ access to class action litigation.191 But an opposite result, securing
access to class action litigation, could merely put firms’ lawyers
on greater guard. AT&T would still advertise free phones and still
charge sales tax on the retail value, but would lawyer up prior to
189 See Marc Weber Tobias, Credit Repair Companies: How to Avoid Being Scammed
(Forbes, May 6, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/S6VQ-8LXN (discussing credit-repair
organizations, scams, and the “fly-by-night” nature of many of these organizations).
190 563 US 333 (2011).
191 See id at 352.
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any public communication as a precaution against litigation and
would add an “asterisk” to its pamphlets—“taxes and other
charges may apply.” Access to litigation morphs into access to information, but disclosure—as discussed above192—triggers the information handicap and is often a regressive policy, serving the
sophisticates who read it.
Third, there is the price effect. Could it be that class actions
improve products and behavior but render them too costly for the
poor? Surely, products are improved when they are more closely
scrutinized by courts or asked to meet higher regulatory standards.
But one does not need to subscribe to the “Chicago School” economic approach to recognize that better products are more closely
scrutinized by courts and cost more in competitive and noncompetitive markets alike. People make different price-quality
tradeoffs, and some consumers would prefer the higher quality
even at a higher price. But not all consumers would benefit. Other
consumers, particularly those with more constrained budgets,
prefer low prices over high quality. They shop at bargain basements and search for marked-down products even if they have
some defects. If class actions increase the price of products, it is
quite possible that the poor may come out as net losers.
To be sure, even a sharp price effect that liability may elicit
could be universally desirable. For example, when the business is
sued for deceptively hiding some service fees, the effect might be
higher upfront prices, but here the higher prices are offset by
lower overall latent fees.193 The higher price is a more salient index for the true cost of the purchase. Higher prices might also be
desirable when consumers underestimate the risks and losses
that might be associated with some products and fail to insure
against loss or discount their value. And it is more than possible
that these benefits associated with salient and informative upfront prices would accrue disproportionately to the poor, who
might otherwise be easier targets for the false allure of teaser
prices and other cognitive traps.194
192

See Part I.C.3.
See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in Consumer Markets 159 (Oxford 2012) (discussing how complexity helps lenders hide the true
price of goods by hiding costs in less salient provisions).
194 In credit card markets, nonsalient prices and fees are incurred primarily by lowincome users and fund the perks enjoyed by more affluent users. See id at 100. It should
be noted, however, that even a reduction and elimination of nonsalient prices may not
remove the cross-subsidy inherent in credit card markets, because the loyalty perks enjoyed by the affluent would be funded by interchange revenue, which in turn leads to
193
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5. Access to courts: Conclusion.
There is a seductive logic to the access-to-courts argument.
Consumers should be entitled to vindicate their rights in forums
that allow them full procedural rights and effective remedies and
charge low filing fees. Boilerplate surrenders of these rights in
favor of mandatory arbitration are therefore widely regarded as
benefitting businesses at the expense of consumers.
But this logic threatens to unravel when consumers are
viewed not as a homogenous army of competent private litigators
eager to burst out of the no-litigation chains, but rather as a heterogeneous class that includes a potentially large subgroup of less
sophisticated and unlikely-to-sue people. Access to litigation
might not help these folks; rather, it helps the stronger, more informed, more litigious consumers. It becomes an access justice
policy with regressive effects.
What makes access to courts potentially unique in the more
general access justice landscape is the litigation externality produced by class actions—the mechanism of vicarious access. Not
all consumers have to sue for all consumers to benefit from the
right to sue. Thus, the strongest case for access to courts and
against mandatory arbitration might very well rest on this deterrence externality. It is possible that various types of socially
harmful conduct are insufficiently deterred by public enforcement
and that private class actions create better compliance, eliminate
harmful conduct, and result in more accurate prices, to the benefit
of all. True, class actions may also lead to unintended and unwelcome burdens on some consumers, but it cannot be categorically
said that such a distributive impact trumps the deterrence benefit
to all consumers.
It is nevertheless noteworthy that the problem of access to
justice that predispute mandatory arbitration agreements create
is falsely branded as the right of weaker victims to receive proper
corrective redress. The benefit to weaker consumers comes neither from equal access nor from equal redress. Rather, it arises
from the opposite: the fact that very few strong consumers actually sue and receive redress and that their actions force bad actors
to pay for their misdeeds. Ironically, deterrence might work best

higher retail prices charged to all. But see Steven Semeraro, The Reverse-Robin-HoodCross-Subsidy Hypothesis: Do Credit Card Systems Effectively Tax the Poor and Reward
the Rich?, 40 Rutgers L J 419, 421 (2009) (offering “reasons to doubt that credit card use
actually increases retail prices in a substantial and systematic way”).
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if access were selective and if the payments of large judgments
went to the pockets of rich plaintiffs’ attorneys, and almost never
to compensate the truly poor and the worst-off among consumers.
The more attorneys benefit from such suits, the more motivated
they would be to produce this form of deterrence. But, I argue, all
this requires great faith in the ability of the class action device to
successfully target only the meritorious claims. It also requires
even greater faith in the motivation of class action lawyers and
the diligence of supervising judges to produce class remedies that
engender valuable deterrence, rather than token gestures (like
improved disclosures) that are themselves regressive.
CONCLUSION
This Article offers a framework to evaluate access justice programs. Such programs open their doors to a large class of people,
but the basic insight of this Article is that not all qualified beneficiaries walk through these doors. Programs that are primarily
utilized by weaker and poorer populations and funded by public
expenditures succeed in their goal to redistribute progressively.
But other programs achieve the opposite. Their open access feature is exploited more by sophisticated elites, enjoying benefits
subsidized by the less well off. They embody the paradox of access
justice.
The first half of this Article surveyed various access justice
policies that are likely associated with a regressive pattern. One
could, of course, perform the opposite exercise and line up various
access programs that have a progressive bias. But because access
justice commentary is inundated with progressive sentiment, the
purpose of the cross-substantive survey here was to ring a caution
bell. Good protective intentions can be gutted by unintended redistributive patterns. The very reasons that make some people
more in need of protection make them also less likely to utilize
open access opportunities.
There is a demoralizing spirit to this argument. It suggests
that the implementation of a protective agenda is more difficult
to achieve than currently thought. Within the regulatory repertoire, policies can be arranged along the scale of their intrusive or
paternalistic quality. At one end, there are the minimally intervening regulatory techniques that leave extensive space for people to make their own decisions (policies like mandated disclosure
and statutory default rules). These devices are notoriously unhelpful to the poor and to those less trained in the acumen of consumer
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choice. At the other end of the spectrum, there are regulatory policies that leave little or no room for personal choice, relying instead on mandated ioutcomes, in-kind allocations, and strict government supervision. Properly designed, such devices can surely
improve the well-being of the weak, but they too are notorious for
their costs and trade-offs. In the interstices lies the regulatory device of access justice. It goes beyond choice architecture by designing, mandating, and paying for specific programs and requiring
that they be open to all. But it stops short of picking out the beneficiaries or mandating the outcomes, instead allowing people to
vary their levels of utilization. Unfortunately, it is the continued
reliance of this device on individuals’ affirmative decisions to seek
out and to deploy the accessible program that paradoxically undermines the redistributive goals of the policy, exposing it to troubling and inequitable patterns.
The second Part of the Article examined a specific open access
policy—access to courts of law. It began by presenting the possibility that this, too, is a policy benefitting elites while costing the
public at large. The concern is that equal access is not enough,
that it takes unique sophistication to vindicate one’s interest
through public courts. Worse, the enhanced liability due to selective access could be rolled into the prices that everyone pays.
But the cross-subsidy concern was only the beginning, not the
conclusion, of the access-to-courts analysis. It is compounded by
another factor: the benefits of litigation could extend to parties
not actively accessing it. This is the deterrence externality due to
class action procedures, what I called vicarious access. Thus, contractual agreements that bar claim aggregation threaten to undermine this proliferation of the otherwise-selective benefit of litigation. We thus learn that the interest of consumers is not open
access to courts for all. Individual suits are a useless privilege to
most. Instead, their interest is consistent with highly restrictive
access, channeled through class actions into a deterrent device.
This interest is served if and only if the representatives select the
right cases for litigation. If plaintiffs choose cases based on anything other than the gravity of the underlying offense to the underrepresented group, the litigation mechanism remains regressive.

